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The ability of unmanned aerial vehicles to execute intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and targeting and strike missions creates a trade-space decision for naval 
aviation programmatic decision makers. In the military’s current fiscal climate, manned 
and unmanned aircraft compete for limited funding. This study takes a simulation 
approach using the simulation modeling framework based on intelligent objects (SIMIO) 
environment to model a fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft anti-surface warfare 
expanded kill chain. It tests and analyzes multiple manned and unmanned aircraft 
configurations. In the evaluation of unclassified concepts of operation and use of 
unclassified data sources, results indicate that aircraft attrition due to hostile weapon 
engagements is the dominant factor in the determination of concept of operation 
efficiency. Based on the operational environment, low cost and less capable unmanned 
aircraft provide an alternative to the increased survivability of manned aircraft or more 
capable and higher cost unmanned aircraft. We provide quantifiable metrics that enable 
the efficient and effective selection of aircraft to execute fast attack craft/fast inshore 
attack craft anti-surface warfare kill chains. 
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The reader is cautioned that the simulation and results presented in this research 
are based on unclassified and notional concepts of operation and data. As such, the results 
of this study may differ significantly from the performance and operation of fielded 
systems and aircraft. Any application of these results without additional verification is at 
the risk of the user.  
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Due to their persistence, versatility and reduction of risk to personnel, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) are an integral part of Department of Defense military operations. 
The performance of UAVs in missions ranging from intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance and targeting to the execution of precision strikes demonstrate their 
capability to act as a force multiplier at both the operational and tactical level. 
Operational success has led to increased UAV funding, research and development, 
procurement and integration into the battlespace. 
Ultimately, under increased Department of Defense budgetary pressure, the value 
of UAVs will be determined by their return on investment versus an equivalently 
mission-capable manned aircraft. In order to determine the return on investment, Naval 
Air System Command program decision makers and operational commands require the 
capability to fully quantity the costs and achievable combat power of various aviation 
platforms in order to increase the validity and effectiveness of programmatic and 
operational decisions. Despite this need for cost-wise validation of UAVs, the current 
methodology utilized to simulate and evaluate kill chain success lacks the key metric of 
cost and excludes the contributions generated through multiple kill chain executions per 
sortie (Dunaway 61). 
 This study evaluates a sub-set of operational or in procurement UAVs and 
manned aircraft in the execution of expanded fast attack craft (FAC)/fast inshore attack 
craft (FIAC) anti-surface warfare (ASUW) kill chains to answer the questions: 
 What is an effective UAV and manned aircraft deployment force structure 
in order to achieve operational FAC / FIAC ASUW mission requirements? 
 Given fixed operational requirements, do UAVs provide a cost effective 
alternative to manned aircraft when operated in a contested ASUW 
environment? 
 What is the added value of UAVs in the execution of an expanded end-to-
end ASUW kill chains? 
 
 xxiv 
This study takes a simulation approach with the simulation modeling framework 
based on intelligent objects (SIMIO) environment to model a fast attack craft / fast 
inshore attack craft ASUW expanded kill chain. We construct a simulation model of an 
expanded kill chain that includes traditional find, fix, track, target, engage and assess 
events and incorporate unclassified or notional aircraft sensor performance, maintenance 
activities, aircraft reliability and ordnance performance.   
 The study considers the execution of a FAC/FIAC ASUW expanded kill chain to 
determine efficient combinations of manned and unmanned aircraft and evaluates the 
performance of three currently operational or in procurement aircraft: the MH-60S 
Knighthawk, the MQ-8C Fire Scout and the RQ-21A Blackjack. We choose the aircraft 
configurations based on unclassified Naval Air System Command and Helicopter Sea 
Combat Wing Pacific concepts of operation (CONOPS) and evaluate proposed future 
CONOPS employing the integration of RQ-21A aircraft.   
The study conducts 132,000 simulations across over 200 modeling parameters 
and variables to represent the behavior of the modeled aircraft and a notional RED threat. 
The simulation results provide information on the performance of the evaluated aircraft 
configurations based on their cost-wise execution of kills chains and their ability to 
effectively destroy enemy forces, reduce enemy forces combat power and timely detect 
both neutral and enemy forces. 
The decisions to procure, deploy, and operationally employ manned and 
unmanned aircraft represent significant naval aviation programmatic decisions. This 
study provides a methodology and through the results of simulated kill chains informs 
decision makers to better equip the warfighter. Below we summarize the primary findings 
of the study: 
 Unmanned aircraft provide a viable and cost effective alternative to 
manned aircraft in the execution of FAC / FIAC ASUW kill chains. 
 Aircraft attrition is the dominant factor in the determination of kill chain 
efficiency. The pursuits of combat survivable or low cost aircraft provide 
valid avenues to achieve cost efficient kill chain execution. 
 xxv 
 Improvement of aircraft sensor capabilities provides the most effective 
method to reduce aircraft combat losses and attrition costs. 
 Aircraft sortie duration and ordnance payload impact the ability to reduce 
enemy combat power. 
This study presents an innovative approach to analyzing kill chain effectiveness 
through the incorporation of aircraft maintenance, reliability and cost. By evaluating the 
relationship between operational effectiveness and cost efficiency this study enables 
exploration of the unmanned and manned aircraft trade-space. 
In conclusion, manned and unmanned aircraft will continue to serve vital 
functions across the spectrum of aviation missions. In the military’s current fiscal 
climate, manned and unmanned aircraft will compete for the limited funding. This thesis 
tests and analyzes vast simulations of multiple manned and unmanned aircraft 
configurations. The results provide quantifiable metrics that enable the efficient and 
effective selection of aircraft to execute FAC / FIAC ASUW kill chains. 
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Unmanned systems, particularly autonomous ones, have to be the new 
normal in ever-increasing areas.  
—Ray Mabus, 
U.S. Secretary of the Navy 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to provide a method for the Department of the 
Navy (DON) to more efficiently deploy manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) in support of operational and tactical requirements. This analysis evaluates the 
life cycle costs and combat efficiency of manned aircraft and UAVs currently in the DON 
research, development and procurement pipeline during the execution of an expanded 
end-to-end kill chain in a fast attack craft (FAC)/fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) anti-
surface warfare (ASUW) mission. The results obtained provide insight into the 
operational benefits, anticipated fiscal costs and efficiency of UAVs operated 
independently or in concert with manned aircraft.  
B. BACKGROUND   
1. UAV Employment and Benefits 
Employment of UAVs has become an integral part of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) military operation (Department of Defense, “Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap” 4). Within the DON, UAVs are currently or projected to perform intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T), anti-submarine (ASW), mine 
counter measure (MCM), and ASUW operations in either conjunction or independent of 
manned aircraft.  
The expanded role of UAVs has prompted significant development and 
procurement. As depicted in Table 1, from fiscal year (FY) 2016 to FY21 the DON 
projects the procurement of 53 UAVs representing an eight percent growth in UAV 
inventory (Department of the Defense, “Highlights of the DON FY2017 Budget” 4–5) 
and an associated 245% increase in funding from 200 million dollars ($M) in FY15 to 
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691 $M in FY17 (Department of Defense, “DOD: FY2017 President’s Budget 
Submission, Feb 2016: Navy Justification Book Vol 1 of 4. Aircraft Procurement” 199). 
During the same time period, manned aircraft with similar mission sets have a projected 
procurement of 230 aircraft representing a one percent increase in inventory (Department 
of the Defense, “Highlights of the DON FY2017 Budget” 4–5) and an associated 15.6% 
decrease in funding from 10,607 $M in FY15 to 8,947 $M in FY17 (Department of 
Defense, “DOD: FY2017 President’s Budget Submission, Feb 2016: Navy Justification 
Book Vol 1 of 4. Aircraft Procurement” 124).   
Table 1.   Department of Navy FY16-21 Aircraft Procurement. Source: 
Department of Defense, “DOD: FY2017 President’s Budget 
Submission, Feb 2016: Navy Justification Book Vol 1 of 4. 
Aircraft Procurement” 125). 
 
 
a. Benefits of UAVs 
This investment in UAVs is driven by three benefits achieved by unmanned 
systems: “persistence, versatility and reduced risk to human life” (Department of 
Defense, “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” 20).  
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(1) Risk Reduction 
UAVs eliminate the requirement to collocate a human operator and the air vehicle 
creating a viable option for high-risk flight operations (e.g., chemical, biological, 
radiological defense (CBRD), anti-access area denial (A2/AD) environments) via vehicle 
automation. Autonomy involves a capability (or a set of capabilities) that enables a 
particular action of a system to be automatic (Department of Defense Defense Science 
Board 1). Levels of automation vary across UAVs, from remote piloted vehicles (RPVs) 
to fully autonomous vehicles providing the capability to perform functions that include 
automated take-off and landing, execution of programmed flight plans and utilization on 
onboard sensors. Automation eliminates the requirement for an onboard human operator 
yet retains the human “in the loop” to perform supervisory functions or operations that by 
design are removed from the automated functionality. Via automation, the risk to human 
operators is removed. 
(2) Persistence 
With the removal of human operators, UAVs are able to reduce vehicle gross 
weight by replacing life support and cockpit components with smaller and lighter 
communication, navigation, and control systems (Scharre 14). This weight reduction 
results in a proportional decrease in required thrust and engine performance further 
reducing the gross weight of UAVs in comparison to manned aircraft. This weight 
reduction directly translates into increased flight duration and reduced refueling 
requirements.  
(3) Versatility 
Through the inclusion of open architecture, UAVs achieve increased versatility. 
Open architecture achieves two key advantages; modular design and standardized 
component interfaces (United States Government Accountability Office 6). Modular 
design enables UAVs to achieve payload versatility. Sensor packages can be selected and 
installed based on environment conditions, maximizing performance. These sensor swaps 
can be accomplished within hours enabling tactical flexibility. Similar modularization of 
weapons payloads will increase the mission flexibility of UAVs. Additionally, open 
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architecture provides standardized component interfaces, which increase commonality 
between power, data and physical systems. Through open architecture, UAV mission 
flexibility is increased and the cost and duration of maintenance for system upgrades are 
reduced. The scope of this benefit is significantly greater for UAVs versus manned 
aircraft due to the lack of life support and in-aircraft control and display requirements 
necessary for manned aircraft, which limit modularity and interface standardization. 
b. Studied Aircraft Overview 
Based on current concepts of operation (CONOPS) and DON procurement and 
development status, three aircraft are included in this study for analysis. (Chapter II 
provides additional aircraft detail.) 
(1) MH-60S Knighthawk–The MH-60S Knighthawk is a multi-mission 
combat manned helicopter supporting ASUW and MCM warfare. It 
deploys aboard air-capable and aviation surface ships (Department of the 
Navy, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 62). 
(2) MQ-8C Fire Scout–The MQ-8 Fire Scout is an unmanned UAV employed 
as an organic ISR, ASUW and MCM asset. It is designed to operate from 
suitably equipped air-capable ships (Department of the Navy, “Naval 
Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 63). 
(3) RQ-21A Blackjack–The RQ-21A Blackjack is a tactical multi-intelligence 
unmanned aerial system (UAS) that will support Marine Corps operations, 
and eventually Navy operations, including expeditionary units and 
regiments, U.S. Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, L-Class 
(amphibious) ships and Naval Special Warfare customers (Department of 
the Navy, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025”  29). 
2. Kill Chains 
Naval aviation uses the term “kill chains” to describe the operational sequence of 
events that must occur to destroy a target: “Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess” 
(F2T2EA) (Department of the Navy, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 14–15).  
a. Kill Chain Events 
 Find—the detection of a contact of military interest 
 Fix—determination of the location of the detected contact 
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 Track—the ability to maintain precise and continuous contact location 
 Target—selection of an appropriate weapon for use against a contact 
 Engage—the authorized employment of selected weapon against a 
designated contact 
 Assess—determination of weapon engagement effectiveness 
b. Kill Chain Execution 
Kill chains sequences can be platform focused or integrated, as depicted in Figure 
1. Platform focused kill chains are executed end-to-end by an individual platform such as 
an aircraft, submarine or surface ship. Integrated kill chains are executed by multiple 
platforms within a single kill chain; for example, one aircraft provides target detection 
and targeting while a surface ship delivers the weapon and a second aircraft performs 
post-engagement assessment.  
While the sequence of events within a kill chain is “platform agnostic,” the 
platform to event pairing in integrated kill chains is dependent on multiple factors which 
influence the effectiveness and kill chain speed of execution to include; platform sensor 
capabilities, command and control network availability and platform on-board ordnance. 
The effectiveness of integrated kill chain execution by manned and unmanned platforms 
is also influenced by command and control authority location. For manned aircraft, the 
command and control authority is co-located aboard the platform. Conversely, for 
unmanned platforms the command and control authority is remotely located. This 
difference in command and control authority location effects the time and 
communications requirements necessary to execute and progress through the kill chain 






Figure 1.  NAVAIR Kill Chains. Source: Department of the Navy, “Naval 
Aviation Vision 2016–2025” (14-15). 
C. MOTIVATION 
The increase in DON UAV investment and procurement requires the development 
and testing of new or modified Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) to evaluate platform 
focused and integrated kill chain execution effectiveness. Current CONOPS for the 
UAVs studied incorporate the pairing of unmanned Fire Scout aircraft and MH-60S 
manned helicopters in the execution of ISR&T, ASUW and ASW operations (Martin 21). 
The Fire Scout’s extended flight endurance and payloads enable a significant increase in 
the warfighter’s maritime domain awareness (MDA) and allow a complementary pairing 
with the sensors and weapons payloads carried by MH-60S in the execution of precision 
ASUW.  
Unlike Fire Scout and MH-60S, the Blackjack has yet to be approved for full rate 
production (FRP) and lacks operational deployments or tested CONOPS. Currently the 
Blackjack is envisioned as an ISR&T multiplier for United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
forces deployed aboard amphibious assault ships and ashore. Blackjack UAVs are 
currently projected to operate independently or in a flight of two, with one aircraft 
conducting a passive mission (target detection) and one aircraft conducting an active 
mission (tracking and targeting) (Department of the Navy, “Performance Based 
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Specification Version 1.6 for STUAS/Tier II UAS” 12). The addition of Fire Scout and 
Blackjack to the DON inventory creates an opportunity to greatly expand the DON 
ability to conduct ISR&T in contested or A2/AD environments and with the future 
inclusion of onboard ordnance a new platform to fully execute ASUW kill chains. 
Under increased DOD budgetary pressure, the return on investment (ROI) of the 
Fire Scout and Blackjack UAV programs increased flight endurance and sensor/ordnance 
payloads will be determined by their ability to effectively increase the warfighter’s 
achievable combat power through the successful execution of operational missions. 
Despite this need for cost-wise validation of the Fire Scout and Blackjack programs, the 
current methodology utilized to simulate and evaluate kill chain success or contributions 
lacks the key metric of cost and excludes the contributions generated through multiple 
kill chain executions per sortie (Dunaway 61). This thesis, through analytical and 
simulation analysis will answer the following questions: 
 What is an effective UAV and manned aircraft deployment force structure 
in order to achieve operational FAC / FIAC ASUW mission requirements? 
 Given fixed operational requirements, do Fire Scout and Blackjack UAVs 
provide a cost effective alternative to manned aircraft when operated in a 
contested ASUW environment? 
 What is the added value of Fire Scout and Blackjack UAVs in the 
execution of  expanded end-to-end ASUW kill chains? 
D. DEFINITIONS AND FOCUS 
1. Definition 
a. Expanded Kill Chain  
This thesis shall specifically address an “expanded kill chain.” The expanded kill 
chain builds upon the conventional F2T2EA kill chain sequence of events by including 
flight deck positioning, takeoff, recovery, mechanical failure rates, mishap rates and post 
flight maintenance activities.  
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b. Cost Elements 
For the purpose of this thesis, expanded kill chains for aircraft and UAVs shall be 
evaluated for efficiency by determining cost per kill executed. Considered cost elements 
shall be composed of the following: 
(1) Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC):  
Calculated by dividing total procurement cost by the number of items to be 
procured. “Total procurement cost includes flyaway, rollaway, sail away cost (that is, 
recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with production of an item such as 
hardware/software, Systems Engineering (SE), engineering changes and warranties), plus 
the costs of procuring Technical Data (TD), training, support equipment, and initial 
spares” (Hagan B-21). In this study, aircraft loss due to enemy fire and catastrophic 
mishaps results in a replacement cost based on the aircraft type-dependent APUC.  
(2) Operating and Support Cost (O&S):  
“A life cycle cost (LCC) cost category that includes all personnel, equipment, 
supplies, software, and services, including contract support, associated with operating, 
modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a defense acquisition 
program in the DOD inventory” (Hagan B-178). 
(3) Ordnance Cost:  
The cost per round of expended ordnance. 
2. Focus 
The focus of this study is the cost-wise efficiency of the UAVs and manned 
aircraft in the execution of expanded kill chains. The purpose is to determine an efficient 
composition of manned and unmanned aircraft to minimize cost per kill. 
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The UAVs and manned aircraft studied are capable of executing various mission 
sets to include ASUW, ASW, MCM and ISR&T. Additionally, all aviation platforms 
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studied utilize multiple sensors, which provide flexibility and effectiveness across 
multiple spectrums and target categories. Simulation and analysis across all possible 
payload configurations, spectrums, and threat environments requires operational, 
maintenance and performance data that is either unavailable or beyond the classification 
of this thesis. This breadth of variables in conjunction with the continued technological 
development of UAVs, prohibits a definitive “solution” across all potential variables and 
scenarios. 
In order to achieve quantifiable and tangible results, this study limits its analysis 
to the case of the described models of UAVs and manned aircraft in the execution of 
contested maritime anti-surface warfare operations occurring in a daylight-operating 
environment as further detailed in Chapter II. The results of this analysis provide a 
method to compare the selected performance metrics across multiple aviation platforms 
and in varying deployment configurations based on fixed operational requirements. 
This study’s analysis is influenced by its underlying assumptions. These 
assumptions can be classified as pertaining to the studied UAVs and aircraft, costing, the 
simulated enemy (RED) forces and scenario development.  
1. Studied UAV and Manned Aircraft Assumptions 
 Airframe performance characteristics utilized will closely mirror those 
currently available. 
 Sensor performance characteristics mirror those currently available or 
approximations are developed through intermediate calculations. 
 Aircraft and UAVs are limited to use of electro-optical (EO) sensors. 
 Weapons carrying and delivery capabilities reflect currently employed or 
projected capabilities. 
 Aircraft and UAVs are deployed and operated in the quantity and 
configuration detailed in existing CONOPS or in notional configurations 
for the purpose of sensitivity analysis and analysis of alternatives. 
 Aircraft and UAV maintenance periods, failure rates and mishap rates are 
based on currently available data or of aircraft/UAVs within the DOD that 
hold similar physical and performance characteristics. 
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2. Costing Assumption 
 All aircraft, UAV and ordnance costs are based on a FY16 baseline. 
 Manpower and training costs are sunk costs and not included in the 
analysis 
 BLUE surface ships procurement and operating costs are sunk costs and 
not included in the analysis. 
3. Simulated Enemy Assumptions 
 RED forces possess no ASUW capabilities and are unable to either hold at 
risk or decrement the effectiveness of BLUE surface ships. 
 RED force levels are notional and not based on any existing or projected 
deployment of any known naval forces. 
 RED maritime forces are limited to patrol craft and coastal patrol boats 
with short-range surface to air missile (SAM) capabilities. 
 RED forces are limited to visual detection. 
4. Scenario Development Assumptions 
 All simulated events occur in a strictly overwater operating environment. 
 All BLUE aircraft flight operations are simulated to occur in a daylight-
operating environment. 
 BLUE forces maintain air superiority within the simulated operating 
environment. 
 Communication and GPS capabilities are continuously maintained in all 
simulations and analysis. 
 Common Control Station (CCS) technology enables interoperability of 
specified quantities and types of manned and unmanned aircraft. 
 RED forces have no fixed tactical deployment. 
 RED forces have no assumed employment tactics. 
 BLUE aircraft and UAV interoperability exists. 
 BLUE aircraft achieve 100% accurate classification of RED and neutral 
contacts 
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F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis is a convergence of the fields of operations research and cost 
estimation. Operations research is primarily lead by the academic and research work 
performed by the United States military, academic institutions and U.S. government 
contracted industries. The field of operations research provides the fundamental 
constructs and theory behind the analytical and simulation analysis performed in this 
study. The development, derivation and calculation of this study’s measures of 
performance and modeling design are based on the principles of operations research. 
Cost-estimation research and discussion in the field of cost estimation is led by academic 
institutions and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). This field guides the 
methodology that enables the development of the fiscal constraints and resources implicit 
in the operation of the studied UAVs and manned aircraft. While no previous work fully 
examines the cost effectiveness of kill chains, we provide a brief description of influential 
previous academic and academic work in the relevant fields in the proceeding 
paragraphs. 
1. Operations Research 
Brickner (30-35) provided an analysis of time critical target kill chains with 
simulation and modeling. Extrapolating and building on the model developed by U.S. 
Navy Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Brickner explored and evaluated the 
effects of system performance and varying CONOPS to validate and provide 
recommendations on the NAVAIR fielded model. The analysis performed by Brickner 
investigates the efficiency and performance of traditional F2T2EA kill chains but does 
not take into the additional events (examples included maintenance and failure rate) 
contained within the expanded kill chain discussed within this study. 
Lee (52-68) studied the concept of kill chain execution by joint manned and 
unmanned vehicles. Using simulation models Lee examined the time efficiencies of the 
manned-unmanned concept. The analysis provided insights into methods to improve 
efficiency through proposed technological developments and modifications to concepts 
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of operation. Lee’s kill chain analysis provides extensive investigation into command and 
control and network requirements that are not included within this study. 
Bloye (18-50) studied the effect of networks on mission effectiveness. The 
analysis centered on the performance metric of time-to-kill and the development of a kill 
chain assessment tool. The assessment tool developed and evaluated a methodology to 
optimize systems of available resources in time-sensitive targeting scenarios. Similar to 
Brickner’s study, Bloye’s study of kill chain analysis does not take into account the 
additional events included in this study’s expanded kill chain. 
2. Cost Estimation 
Godshaw (87-92) performed a cost-effective analysis of unmanned aerial vehicles 
and satellite systems. Focusing on the procurement, availability and capabilities of 
multiple UAV and satellite systems, the study developed recommendations to optimize 
the cost effectiveness of unmanned systems in the performance of surveillance and 
reconnaissance. While comprehensive in the field of cost analysis, Godshaw’s study does 
not incorporate the dynamic and statistical impact of the kill chain events utilized in this 
study. 
Yilmaz (28-35) conducted a study on the cost effectiveness of UAVs. Examining 
procurement and operational costs, the research conducted on analysis of alternatives in 
the performance of border security.  
G. THESIS FLOW 
Chapter II discusses scenario development. It also establishes measurement of 
performance, methodology, utilized data sets and sources. Chapter III describes the 
implementation of an object model paradigm simulation package, SIMIO to perform 
continuous analytical analysis of the extended kill chain. Chapter IV presents the initial 
simulation results. Chapter V investigates model sensitivity and presents an analysis of 
alternatives. Chapter VI provides conclusion and recommendations.  
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II. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND SOURCES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides background for the scenario development and modeling 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of multiple combinations of manned and unmanned 
aerial vehicles within the USN research, testing, development and evaluation (RTD&E), 
and procurement process or in current operational use. It describes the models of aircraft 
systems to be evaluated, defines the study’s measures of effectiveness (MOE) and 
measures of performance (MOP), and details the operational scenario and concepts of 
operational employment. 
B. EVALUATED AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS 
The following section presents the three aircraft that are analyzed within this 
study. Along with general descriptions of the aircraft and their associated primary 
mission sets, we present aircraft, sensor and ordnance performance and cost data utilized 
within the study. 
1. MQ-8 Fire Scout  
The MQ-8 Fire Scout (Figure 2) is a vertical takeoff and landing tactical 
unmanned aerial vehicle designed to operate from equipped air-capable ships 
(Department of Defense, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 63) and is manufactured 





Figure 2.  MQ-8C Fire Scout. Source: Northrop Grumman (par. 1). 
The Fire Scout unmanned aerial system (UAS) includes air vehicles, sensor 
packages, a tactical data link and mission control system. It is capable of automated take-
offs and landings and executing programmed flight patterns. Current sensor packages 
include electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) and laser designation capabilities. Future 
modifications of the Fire Scout plan incorporate Advanced Precise Kill Weapons System 
II (APKWS II), Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) mine 
detection system and maritime radar sensors. With a range of 150 nautical miles and 
flight endurance of 12 hours, these sensor and ordnance payloads will allow Fire Scout to 
perform ISR&T, ASUW, ASW, and MCM mission in support of combatant commanders 
(MQ-8C Fire Scout Data Sheet 1). 
 Fire Scout received approval for low rate initial production (LRIP) in 2007, Full 
Rate Production (FRP) in 2009 and projected procurement is nine Fire Scout UAS by 
2021 (Department of Defense, “Selected Acquisition Report: MQ-8 Fire Scout” 9). The 
Fire Scout UAS average unit procurement cost (APUC) is 28.261 $M FY16 (Volpe 1).  
a. Vehicle, Sensor and Ordnance Specifications  
Table 2 provides a summary of the MQ-8C vehicle, sensor and ordnance 
performance specifications. NAVAIR, program executive office (PEO) unmanned aviation 
and strike weapons (U&W) provided aircraft performance data (Wolt 1-5). We obtained 
sensor data from FLIR Systems Incorporated (FLIR.com) and ordnance performance data 
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from Jane’s Air Launched Weapons (janes.ihs.com). Table 2 annotates performance 
parameters determined through intermediated calculations as “Calculated” for the data 
source and “Notional” for all notional values. The calculations appear in Appendix A.  
Table 2.   MQ-8C Aircraft, Sensor and Ordnance Performance 
 Source 









































b. Vehicle Maintenance and Reliability 
Table 3 presents MQ-8C maintenance data. NAVAIR, program manager air (PMA) 
266, Fire Scout Mission Systems Assistant Deputy Program Manager provided mean time 
between failure (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) data (Rioux 13). Helicopter Sea 
Combat Wing Pacific (HSCWINGPAC) (Martin 26) provided scheduled maintenance 
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interval and duration data. We calculate planned maintenance interval durations based on 
mean duration of anticipated hourly and daily maintenance requirements. 
Table 3.   MQ-8 Maintenance and Reliability Data 
 Source 
















c. Vehicle Mishap Rates  
Naval Safety Center provided MQ-8 mishap rates, as of 15 March 2016. Based on 
cumulative data collected from FY10 to FY16, the MQ-8 catastrophic mishap rate is 53.3 
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours (Perry 2). 
d. Vehicle and Ordnance Cost Data  
NAVAIR, PEO (U&W) 4.2, provided MQ-8 vehicle cost data (Volpe 2). The 
DOD FY17 President’s Budget, Navy Weapons Book (Department of Defense 131–135) 
provided HELLFIRE cost data and the DOD FY17 President’s Budget, Navy 
Ammunition Book (Department of Defense, “Department of Defense FY2017 President’s 
Budget. Navy Ammunition Book” 110–115) provided APKWS-II cost data. Table 4 
presents APUC, ordnance and derived cost per flight hour data for the MQ-8. Operating 
cost per flight hour calculation is based on NAVAIR provided budgeted O&S costs and 
annual flight hour projections (Volpe 2). Chapter IV details cost per flight hour 
methodology and Appendix B contains sample calculations. 
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Table 4.   MQ-8C Aircraft and Ordnance Cost Data 
 Source 
Air Vehicle MQ-8 
APUC (per vehicle) 
(FY16 $M) 
27.48 Volpe 















2. RQ-21 Blackjack 
The RQ-21 Blackjack (Figure 3) is a twin tailed, fixed wing small tactical 
unmanned aircraft system (STUAS) designed to provide tactical ISR capability for 
amphibious assault ships manufactured by Boeing/Insitu Incorporated. The Blackjack 
UAS consists of five aircraft, a control station, launch and recovery equipment, tactical 
data links, multi-mission payloads and support equipment. It is capable of performing 
shipboard take-offs and recoveries. Current sensor packages include EO/IR, and a laser 
rangefinder/designator. Future payloads are projected to provide laser designation 
capabilities. With cruising speeds of 80 nautical miles per hour and a flight endurance of 
ten hours, the Blackjack is designed to provide persistent maritime and overland ISR&T 
capabilities (Department of the Navy, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 29). 
LRIP approval for Blackjack occurred in 2013 and FRP approval is anticipated in 
2016. Blackjack projected procurement is 37 Blackjack UAS through FY21 (Volpe 3). 




Figure 3.  RQ-21 Blackjack. Source: United States Navy (par. 3) 
a. Vehicle and Sensor Specifications  
NAVAIR, PEO (U&W) provided RQ-21 performance specifications (Wolt 1-5). 
We reference Hoodtech Incorporated (hoodtechvision.com), the Office of the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reports for the RQ-21 (Department of 
Defense, “FY15 Navy Programs: RQ-21A Blackjack UAS” 1–5) and the DON, PEO 
(U&W) Performance Based Specifications for STUAS (Department of the Navy, “PBS 
Version 1.6 for STUAS/Tier II UAS” 15–20) for sensor specifications. Appendix A 
presents sensor performance values calculations. Table 5 presents performance data and 
applicable sources. “Calculated” annotates performance parameters determined through 
intermediated calculations and “Notional” annotates all notional values.  
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Table 5.   RQ-21 Aircraft and Sensor Performance 
 Source 






























b. Vehicle Maintenance and reliability 
The study uses established DOT&E (Department of Defense, “FY15 Navy 
Programs: RQ-21A Blackjack UAS” 3) and PEO U&W (Department of the Navy, “PBS 
Version 1.6 for STUAS/Tier II UAS” 80–83) key performance parameters for RQ-21 
maintenance and reliability statistics. Table 6 summarizes the maintenance and reliability 








Table 6.   RQ-21 Maintenance and Reliability Data 
 Source 
















c. Vehicle Mishap Rates  
The key performance parameter for the RQ-21 mishap rate is one mishap per 1000 
flight hours (Department of the Navy, “PBS Version 1.6 for STUAS/Tier II UAS”  3). 
d. Vehicle Cost Data 
NAVAIR, PEO (U&W) 4.2 provided RQ-21 cost data (Volpe 3). Table 7 presents 
RQ-21 APUC and derived cost per flight hour data. Operating cost per flight hour 
calculation is based on NAVAIR, PEO (U&W) 4.2 provided budgeted O&S costs and 
annual flight hour projections (Volpe 3). Chapter IV details cost-per-flight-hour 






Table 7.   RQ-21 Aircraft Cost Data 
 Source 
Air Vehicle RQ-21 
APUC (per vehicle) 
(FY16 $M) 
4.33 Volpe 




3. MH-60S  
The MH-60S (Figure 4) is a multi-mission combat helicopter designed to provide 
surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, combat search and 
rescue and logistics capabilities to aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships and air 
capable surface ships. Current sensors and payloads include EO/IR sensors, HELLFIRE 
missiles, a 20 millimeter fixed forward firing gun and crew served weapons. Future 
payloads include an airborne laser mine detection and neutralization system and 
APKWS-II. With a cruise speed of 75 nautical miles per hour, flight endurance of three 
and a half hours and current payloads the MH-60S is capable of executing ISR&T and 
ASUW missions (Department of the Navy, “Naval Aviation Vision 2016–2025” 62). 
MH-60S LRIP occurred in 1998, FRP in 2002 and DON procurement completion 
occurred in 2015 with the purchase of 275 helicopters (Department of Defense, “SAR: 









Figure 4.  MH-60S Knighthawk. Source: Sikorsky (par. 1). 
a. Aircraft, Sensor and Ordnance Specifications  
Table 8 provides a summary of the MH-60S aircraft, sensor and ordnance 
parameters used in the study. The study references NAVAIR (Naval Air Systems 
Command 1) for aircraft performance specifications. The Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Weatherington 12-15) provided 
information regarding sensor specifications. We obtain ordnance performance data from 
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons (janes.ihs.com), Defensetech.com (McGarry par. 4) and 
Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution (Whittle 195). Table 8 annotates 
performance parameters determined through intermediate calculations as “Calculated” for 

























































Maximum Payload 19 McGarry 
 
b. Aircraft Maintenance and Reliability 
The study uses key performance parameters obtained from DOD Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) (Department of Defense, “SAR: MH-60S Fleet Combat 
Support Helicopter” 6) and HSCWINGPAC provided historical data (Martin 26) for 
maintenance and reliability statistics. We calculate planned maintenance interval durations 
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based on mean duration of anticipated hourly and daily maintenance requirements. Table 9 
presents the maintenance and reliability data modeled for the MH-60S.  





20.3 DOD  
MTTR 
(hrs) 










c. Vehicle Mishap Rates  
The Naval Safety Center provided MH-60S mishap rates, as of 15 March 2016 
(Perry 2). Based on a historical average from FY00 to FY16, the MH-60S catastrophic 
mishap rate is 1.33 catastrophic mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.  
d. Vehicle Cost Data 
The MH-60S DOD SAR (Department of Defense, “SAR: MH-60S Fleet Combat 
Support Helicopter” 7) provided MH-60S aircraft cost data. The DOD FY17 President’s 
Budget, Navy Weapons Book (Department of Defense, “DOD FY2017: President’s 
Budget. Navy Weapons Book” 131–135) provided HELLFIRE cost data and the DOD 
FY17 President’s Budget, Navy Ammunition Book (Department of Defense, “DOD 
FY2017: President’s Budget. Navy Ammunition Book” 110–115) provided APKWS-II 
cost data. Table 10 presents APUC, ordnance and derived cost per flight hour data for the 
MH-60S. Operating cost per flight hour calculation is based on the MH-60S DOD SAR 
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budgeted O&S costs and annual flight hour projections. Chapter IV details cost per flight 
hour methodology and Appendix B contains sample calculations. 
Table 10.   MH-60S Aircraft and Ordnance Cost Data 
 Source 
Aircraft MH-60 
APUC (per aircraft) 
(FY16 $M) 
28.46 DOD 















C. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
In order to evaluate the performance and cost efficiency of the UAVs and manned 
aircraft within this study, the scenario underlying the analysis and simulation is structured 
to represent currently projected tactical situations and asset utilization. According to the 
United States Joint Sea Services, the ability to gain and maintain sea control is one of the 
essential functions to defeat aggression and protect the maritime commons (Department 
of the Defense, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” 22–26). Surface 
warfare via integrated kinetic fires enables the destruction of enemy naval forces, 
resulting in the establishment of local maritime superiority. As such this study focuses on 
a simulated anti-surface warfare campaign and provides operational and programmatic 
planners with a tool to determine the effectiveness of various combinations of manned 
and unmanned aircraft in the execution of the kill chain for enemy naval surface threats. 
For the purpose of this study, we utilize a non-geographic specific area of 
operations (AO) to represent the projected operational use of UAVs and manned aircraft 
within a maritime mission environment. The description below provides a brief 
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description of the measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), 
scenario operational environment, initial conditions, operating conditions, and concept of 
operation that we use in the analysis contained in subsequent chapters. 
1. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
The MOEs developed and evaluated by this study pertain to the advantage of 
various combinations of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles in the execution of a 
surface warfare kill chain. The MOEs are 
 Mean detection time 
 Mean time to 50% attrition of hostile naval vessels  
 Number of hostile forces killed per campaign.  
The time to detection and classification of hostile naval forces and the time to 
destruction of hostile (RED) naval vessels directly affects the survivability of BLUE 
forces and the expenditure of resources required to fully develop the BLUE force 
maritime domain awareness (MDA). Through the minimization of the duration of these 
events, expedient identification and separation of RED from neutral forces (commercial 
shipping and maritime traffic) is achieved and enables the subsequent targeting and 
destruction of RED forces. Additionally, through the minimization of time to RED 
classification, the BLUE common operating picture (COP) develops more rapidly 
enabling the improved allocation of BLUE resources. Minimized time to detection, 
classification and destruction of RED forces achieves improved attrition of RED forces, 
preservation of BLUE forces and improved BLUE force combat power. 
Through determination of the mean time until 50 percent attrition of RED forces, 
the study compares and evaluates the combat effectiveness of multiple manned and 
unmanned aircraft combinations. The study selects 50 percent as a measurement for when 
RED forces no longer retain combat effectiveness (Kline par. 2). By observing the 
number of RED detections and destructions over the length of a campaign, the study 
evaluates the effect of aircraft availability on FAC / FIAC ASUW kill chains for various 
combinations of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. Aircraft availability is influenced 
by maintenance requirements, aircraft loss to hostile fire and loss to catastrophic failure. 
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The study evaluates the aircraft over the duration of a campaign to ensure the 
probabilistic rate of occurrence of these events is adequately captured. Chapter III 
presents the methodology and derivation of the MOEs. 
2. Measures of Performance (MOP) 
The MOP developed and evaluated during this study pertains to the cost-wise 
advantage of various combinations of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles in the 
execution of a surface warfare kill chain. The evaluated MOP is 
 Cost per hostile kill 
Cost per RED kill is evaluated over the length of a campaign to provide 
operational and programmatic planners with insight into the projected cost and relative 
fiscal savings or expenses that result from various combinations of manned and 
unmanned systems. Chapter IV provides the methodology and derivation of the MOP. 
3. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) Scenario 
The scenario presented is representative of potential naval conflicts and 
subsequent combat operations while not directly associated with any specific geographic 
location or adversary.    
a. Background and Initial Conditions 
The AO is characterized as a regional conflict in which BLUE naval forces 
support the enforcement of ally nation territorial waters. BLUE naval forces include a 
surface action group (SAG) composed of two strike capable surface combatants (guided 
missile cruiser (CG) / guided missile destroyer (DDG)) and one amphibious ship (littoral 
combat ship (LCS) / amphibious transport dock (LPD) / landing ship dock (LSD)). RED 
naval forces include coastal patrol boats and fast attack craft. RED forces contain no 
aviation assets.  
The U.S. mission is to establish maritime supremacy and defeat RED naval forces 
within the AO. The mission for all available BLUE aviation assets is the detection, 
tracking and classification of all RED naval forces within the AO. If able, BLUE aviation 
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assets are additionally tasked with the destruction or provision of targeting data for 
additional BLUE asset prosecution of all RED naval forces. 
b. Operating Conditions 
In order to reduce the number of variables in the model, aircraft are limited to EO 
sensors. The study further controls sensor performance variability by restricting the 
model’s operating environment to day only over-water operations with negligible cloud 
cover. The maritime environment consists of open-ocean and littoral waters. Variable 
volumes of neutral shipping are present within the AO. The study’s modeled AO is a 
non-permissive environment.  
c. BLUE Forces 
All BLUE aviation assets are based and operated from BLUE air capable ships. 
BLUE aviation assets quantities in the presented CONOPS are “upon-deployment” 
numbers suffer attrition from RED fires and catastrophic mishaps and are non-
replenishable within the simulated campaign. BLUE air-capable ships are the takeoff, 
recovery, refueling and rearmament locations for all BLUE aviation assets. For the 
simulation, BLUE air-capable ships have unlimited aviation ordnance and fuel stores and 
do not suffer attrition.  
d. RED Forces 
RED force distribution is randomized throughout the designed AO. RED naval 
forces have no predetermined tactics and the study does not incorporate RED force 
coordination in the model. RED naval forces suffer attrition from BLUE aviation asset 
fires. Table 11 references Jane’s Fighting Ships (janes.ihs.com) for RED naval forces 






Table 11.   RED Naval Forces and Ordnance Performance Data 
 Source 
Ship Type 























Passive IR seeker 
Jane’s 
 
e. Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) 
Within this study, the selection of unclassified CONOPS for evaluation is 
motivated by current HSCWINGPAC deployment configurations (Hock pars. 4-7) and 
proposed configurations based on potential technological growth and development.  
(1) CONOPS 1: MH-60 and MQ-8 (HSCWINGPAC / Current) 
MQ-8 and MH-60 aircraft conduct joint ASUW operations within the AO. MOEs 
and MOPs will be evaluated across a SAG embarked with 3 MQ-8 and three MH-60. 
MQ-8 and MH-60 aircraft are tasked with RED detection, classification and targeting. 
MH-60 aircraft are tasked with the prosecution of self-designated and MQ-8 designated 
targets via HELLFIRE missiles. Evaluation of CONOPS 1 also included a MH-60 only 
equipped SAG. Table 12 presents the CONOPS 1 aircraft tasks and SAG configurations.  
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CONOPS 1A 3 3 
MQ-8: RED detection, classification and targeting 
MH-60: RED detection, classification, targeting and 




MH-60: RED detection, classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via HELLFIRE) 
 
(2) CONOPS 2: MH-60 and MQ-8 (Future) 
MQ-8 and MH-60 aircraft conduct joint ASUW operations within the AO. 
CONOPS 2 includes the utilization of planned technological advances to include MH-60 
APKWS II and MQ-8 employment of APKWS II weapon systems. Inclusion of this 
technology enables MQ-8 target prosecution. MQ-8 and MH-60 execute end-to-end FAC 
/ FIAC ASUW kill chains. Table 13 presents the CONOPS 2 aircraft tasks and SAG 
configurations.  







CONOPS 2A 3 3 
MQ-8: RED detection, classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
MH-60: RED detection, classification, targeting and 




MH-60: RED detection, classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
 
(3) CONOPS 3: MH-60 and RQ-21 (Future) 
Programmatically, the RQ-21’s projected utilization is as a United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) ground and sea based ISR&T asset. CONOPS 3 extends that utilization 
and incorporates the RQ-21 into the aviation assets available to the BLUE naval forces 
within the scenario. Modeled RQ-21s are equipped with planned sensor payloads to 
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include laser designation capabilities. CONOPS 3 models MH-60 aircraft with APKWS II 
ordnance. RQ-21 and MH-60 aircraft perform RED detection, classification and targeting. 
MH-60 aircraft execute the prosecution of self-designated and RQ-21 designated targets. 
Table 14 presents the CONOPS 3 aircraft tasks and SAG configurations.  







CONOPS 3 4 6 
RQ-21: RED detection, classification and targeting 
MH-60: RED detection, classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
 
(4) CONOPS 4: MQ-8 and RQ-21 – Unmanned Only (Future) 
CONOPS 4 evaluates an unmanned vehicle only SAG configuration. Modeled 
RQ-21s are equipped with planned sensor payloads to include laser designation 
capabilities. CONOPS 4 models MQ-8 with APKWS II ordnance. RQ-21 and MQ-8 
aircraft perform RED detection, classification and targeting. MQ-8 aircraft execute the 
prosecution of self-designated and RQ-21 designated targets. Table 15 presents the 
CONOPS 4 aircraft tasks and SAG configurations. 





CONOPS 4 3 9 
RQ-21: RED detection, classification and targeting 
MQ-8: RED detection, classification, targeting and 










This chapter introduces the simulation model utilized in the study. The chapter 
contains an end-to-end description and explanation of the processes incorporated in the 
model and initial results.  
B. SIMULATION AND MODELING 
For this study, we select SIMIO, Simulation modeling framework based on 
intelligent object (Thiesing and Pegden 1–4), as the application to model, simulate and 
perform analysis of the expanded kill chain. SIMIO is a software application used in the 
Naval Postgraduate School Operations Research program and facilitates the modeling, 
simulation and analysis of dynamic systems. Benefits of SIMIO include the ability to 
incorporate multiple events and entity types within a single model, the application of 
discrete and continuous systems and the ability to rapidly process iterative simulations in 
support of statistical analysis.  
1. SIMIO 
In SIMIO, the base unit is an object. Objects in SIMIO represent machines, 
processes, and facilities. In this simulation, the primary objects of interest are manned 
aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and specific events (examples include maintenance, 
takeoff and surveillance). We construct a model to represent a real world system through 
the connection of these objects. In this study, the system represents an expanded FAC / 
FIAC ASUW kill chain.  
In conjunction with its object-based orientation, SIMIO supports the development 
of a modeling environment containing processes, system dynamics and methods for post 
simulation analysis.  
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a. Properties and States 
Properties control the behavior and actions of the object within the model. 
Examples are flight endurance, maximum velocity and scheduled maintenance interval. 
User created and defined properties allow high levels of model customization and fully 
developed object behaviors. A second method to define objects is through the use of state 
variables. Unlike properties, state variables change during the course of the simulation. 
Total flight time, ordnance payload, and altitude are examples of state values used in the 
study. Properties and states may be assigned to specific model objects or apply to the 
entire modeled system. In its entirety, this model contains 54 defined properties variables 
and 133 defined state variables listed and described in Appendix C. Table 16 lists the 
principle property and state variables utilized to determine aircraft, sensor and ordnance 
performance and behavior within the model. 
Table 16.   Model Property and State Variables 
Aircraft Property and State Variables 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
Sortie Duration 
Maximum fuel limited 
flight time 




Scalar Real knots 
Search Velocity 
Aircraft velocity while 
conducting searches  
Scalar Real knots 
Spotting Duration 
Aircraft time to 
complete flight deck 
spotting 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Takeoff Duration 
Aircraft time to 
complete takeoff 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Search Altitude 
Aircraft altitude while 
conducting search 
operations 
Scalar Real m 
Search Slant Range 
Aircraft slant range to 
surface contact while 
conducting search 
operations 
Scalar Real m 
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Aircraft Property and State Variables 
CID Duration 
Time for aircraft to 
perform classification 
of surface contact 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
CID Altitude 
Aircraft altitude while 
classifying a surface 
contact 
Scalar Real m 
CID Slant Range 
Aircraft slant range to 
surface contact during 
classification 
Scalar Real m 
Assessment Duration 
Time for aircraft to 
perform battle damage 
assessment 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Weapon Altitude 
Aircraft altitude during 
weapon engagements 
Scalar Real m 
Weapon Slant Range 
Aircraft slant range 
during weapon 
engagements 
Scalar Real m 
Recovery Duration 
Aircraft time to 
complete recovery and 
landing 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Interval 
Aircraft flight hours 
between required 
maintenance actions 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Post Flight Maintenance 
Duration 
Time to perform post 
flight maintenance 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Unscheduled Maintenance 
Duration 
Time to perform 
unscheduled 
maintenance 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Duration 
Time to perform 
scheduled maintenance 




Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Mishap Rate 
Aircraft number of 
flight hours between 
mishaps 







Sensor and Ordnance Properties and State Variables 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
Search Sweepwidth 
EO sensor sweepwidth 
while conducting 
search operations 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 




Scalar Real M 













Scalar Real M 
 
b. Object Classifications 
This study utilizes two object classifications: events and agents.  
(1) Events 
Placed in a specific sequence in the model, events represent activities or actions 
that occur during the simulation. In this study, events represent the sequence of actions 
that occur during the execution of the expanded kill chain, such as flight deck spotting, 
takeoff, surveillance and recovery.  
(2) Agents 
Agents are objects that move freely in the designed system model. Agents in this 
model represent individual objects or entities that act independently and interact with the 
entire system and other objects, examples of agents used in this study are the model 
entities for the RQ-21 Blackjack, MH-60S, and the MQ-8C Fire Scout. 
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c. Links 
Links connect modeled objects. Links are the designed pathways that agents can 
travel. User defined conditional parameters assign link routing and direct agents to either 
travel along their current path or select an alternate path with conditions that meet the 
behaviors of the agent. An example in this model is the direction of aircraft following 
surface contact classification. Upon classification of a surface contact as hostile, the 
BLUE aircraft is routed along the link to the weaponeering event, while upon neutral 
classification the aircraft is routed back to surveillance. 
d. Processes 
In SIMIO, processes incorporate intelligence in objects (Thiesing and Pegden 2). 
Intelligence directs an object’s behavior in response to events in the system. Processes 
incorporate dynamic changes to objects in the model. Each process represents a step 
triggered by an event in the model. The use of single or multiple processes develops 
model logic. Processes include determination of link selection, changes to object states, 
agent movement delays in the system or temporarily termination of a sequence of events. 
Embedded processes in events control the movement of the modeled aircraft, such as the 
adjustment of an aircraft’s fuel state as a function of its sortie duration, or the designation 
of an aircraft’s flight altitude while conducting surveillance. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
The objective is to model the entire sequence of events representing a FAC/FIAC 
ASUW expanded end to end kill chain for manned aircraft and UAVs in order to evaluate 
air vehicles CONOPS for kill chain execution effectiveness. The model incorporates all 
expanded kill chain events from flight deck spotting, takeoff, surveillance, classification 
and identification, weapon engagement, post engagement assessment, landing and post 
flight maintenance. Throughout the model, entities representing the studied manned 
aircraft and UAVs are exposed to potential loss due to mishap and RED threats as well as 
in-flight mechanical failures. The objective measures of effectiveness are average 
detection time (hostile or neutral), number of RED forces killed in a finite time period, 
and time until 50 percent attrition of RED forces. The objective measure of performance 
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is average cost per kill ( ave
kC ), defined as the aggregate cost divided by the total number 
of kills.  
1. Aggregate Cost Calculation 
The aggregate cost ( totalC ) is the summation of cost incurred due to aircraft loss (
L ), aircraft operational costs ( opC ) and the costs of expended ordnance ( ordC ). In the 
following sections and equations, y represents the type of aircraft (MH-60S, MQ-8C, or 
RQ-21) and x identifies individual aircraft. Therefore, the subscript x,y represents the thx  
aircraft of type y.  
a. Cost Due to Aircraft Loss 
Costs due to aircraft loss ( L ) result from effective RED engagements against 
BLUE aircraft ( REDLoss ) or BLUE aircraft catastrophic mishaps ( MISHAPLoss ). These 
costs are aircraft type (MH-60, RQ-21, or MQ-8C) dependent.  
 
 
 RED MISHAP, ,
,
Sets:
x  X = 0,1,2,...,   number of individual aircraft type
y  Y = 1,2,3   type/model/series of aircraft








b. Aircraft Operational Costs 
Examples of costs due to aircraft operation include fuel, maintenance and 
personnel. The study calculates operational costs by the summation of the individual 
aircraft flight hours executed in the simulation (T ) multiplied by the average hourly 
Operation and Support (O&S) cost ( hrC ). The study calculates average hourly O&S costs 
( hrC ) by dividing the average annual O&S costs by the projected annual flight hours per 
aircraft. Average hourly O&S costs are aircraft type dependent. Appendix B provides 







x  X = 0,1,2,...,   number of individual aircraft type
y  Y = 1,2,3   type/model/series of aircraft








c. Ordnance Costs 
Ordnance costs ( ordC ) include the expense incurred due to the expenditure of 
ordnance in the execution of a kill chain. The study calculates ordnance costs by the 
summation of the aircraft ordnance fired ( shotO ) multiplied by the cost per round ( Cround ). 
The study models two types of ordnance: AGM-114 HELLFIRE and APKWS-II 







x  X = 0,1,2,...,   number of individual aircraft type
y  Y = 1,2,3   type/model/series of aircraft
 Z = 1,2   type ordnance












d. Aggregate Cost Equation 
Based on the equations derived in Chapter III.C.1.a-c the complete equation for 





x  X = 0,1,2,...,   number of individual aircraft type
y  Y = 1,2,3   type/model/series of aircraft
z  Z = 1,2  types of ordnance
C C C
 aggregate cost












C aircraft operational cost (III.C.1b)







2. Red Kill Determination 
Total RED kills (
REDK ) is determined through the summation of all BLUE 
aircraft RED kills during a simulation of finite length. ,x yK represents the number of RED 






x  X = 0,1,2,...,   number of individual aircraft type












3. Aggregate Cost Equation 
Based on equations developed in III.C.1d and IIII.C.2, the resultant equation for 
the study’s MOP of average cost per kill ( ave






















D. SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The model is structured to represent 24 hours per day operations under the 
following baseline conditions: 
 Operational Area – 3927 
2nm   
 RED force level – 20 
 Neutral shipping level – 100 
 Simulation duration – 30 days 
The size of the operational area approximates a semi-circular area with a 50 nm 
radius and the BLUE air capable ship located at the center. These dimensions enable the 
deployed air vehicles to remain within their communication and navigation system 
maximum range constraints. 
Despite a continuous 24-hour run time, the model is strictly designed to evaluate 
day only electro-optical sensor performance. This limits aircraft flight operations to 12 
hours of daylight operations per day. Aircraft maintenance activities occur 24 hours a 
day. The model does not take into account the effects of weather, with the exception of 
RED visual detection range and RED probability of detecting BLUE via the U.S. Army 
Night Vision Integrated Performance Model software (U.S. Army, NV-IPM V1.2).  
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E. OVERALL MODEL LOGIC 
While kill chains generally contain the sequence of tasks FIND, FIX, TRACK, 
TARGET, ENGAGE and ASSESS, this model redefines these tasks with the following 
events: SURVEILLANCE, CLASSIFICATION, WEAPON ENGAGEMENT and 
ASSESSMENT. The inclusion of FLIGHT DECK SPOTTING, TAKEOFF, and 
AIRCRAFT MAINTENACE further develops the kill chain. Figure 5 describes an 
overview of the basic logic for BLUE aircraft in the model. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Expanded Kill Chain BLUE Logic 
1. Blue Aircraft Routing Overview 
Inherent properties of the modeled aircraft (e.g., maximum velocity and scheduled 
maintenance interval) or properties assigned to the aircraft during the execution of the 
simulation, route aircraft through the simulated extended kill chain. Upon initialization of 
the simulation, the user-defined number of aircraft enters the modeled kill chain at the 
FLIGHT DECK SPOTTING event. This event represents maintenance, on-board fuel and 
ordnance mission ready aircraft. After flight deck spotting, aircraft transition to the 
TAKEOFF event. The takeoff event represents the transition from on-deck to in-flight 
configuration. From TAKEOFF, aircraft commence search efforts via the 
SURVEILLANCE event. Upon aircraft detection of a surface contact, the aircraft 
transitions to the CLASSIFICATION event where the contact identification as hostile 
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(RED) or neutral occurs. At this decision point, aircraft follow one of two routes; upon 
identification of a neutral contact, the aircraft is rerouted to SURVEILLANCE to 
reinitiate the search for additional surface contacts, following identification of a hostile 
(RED) contact, aircraft are directed to the WEAPON ENGAGEMENT event for hostile 
prosecution. At the conclusion of WEAPON ENGAGEMENT, aircraft perform battle 
damage assessment and obtain confirmation of a RED kill or the requirement for a 
weapon re-engagement. RED kill confirmation reroutes the aircraft to SURVEILLANCE 
for additional targets. The requirement for weapon re-engagement reroutes aircraft to 
WEAPON ENGAGEMENT. The simulation monitors BLUE aircraft fuel state, 
mechanical failures and ordnance payload throughout the simulation. Depletion of 
ordnance, reaching minimum operational fuel, or suffering an in-flight mechanical failure 
routes BLUE aircraft for landing via the RECOVERY event. Completion of 
RECOVERY routes aircraft to POST FLIGHT MAINTENANCE, UNSCHEDULED 
MAINTENANCE or SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE based on the landing requirement 
conditions. Maintenance event completion routes aircraft to FLIGHT DECK SPOTTING 
and completes a kill chain sequence. Section G provided additional kill chain event and 
internal event process details. 
F. RED THREAT INTERACTION 
Within the model, the capability for RED surface contacts to employ surface to air 
missiles (SAM) against BLUE aircraft is incorporated in the process logic during the 
SURVEILLANCE, CLASSIFICATION, WEAPON ENGAGEMENT and 
ASSESSMENT events. Figure 6 describes an overview of the basic logic for RED threat 







Figure 6.  RED Threat Interaction 
1. Red Threat Logic Overview 
Process logic in the SURVEILLANCE, CLASSIFICATION, WEAPON 
ENGAGEMENT and ASSESSMENT events compares the BLUE aircraft’s altitude and 
slant range from the RED surface contact to the maximum altitude and range of the RED 
SAM. If the BLUE aircraft is within the RED threat envelope, the comparison of BLUE 
and RED detection and engagement rates determines subsequent actions. If the duration 
of the RED detect to engage sequence is less than BLUE, RED engages BLUE with a 
SAM. If the BLUE detect to engage sequence is less than RED, BLUE proceeds to the 
next event in the kill chain process. RED weapon engagement results in a BLUE kill with 
a RED hit or BLUE routed to the REATTACK event with a RED miss. The REATTACK 
event represents a compressed kill chain with abbreviated classification and weapon 
 45 
engagement durations. The comparison of detect to engage rate is repeated in the 
REATTACK event with the following outcomes; RED executes an additional weapon 
engagement or BLUE is routed to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT. Section G.2.h presents 
additional RED threat interaction and internal event process details.  
G. SIMULATION DESIGN 
Processes internal to events (examples include TAKEOFF, SURVEILLANCE, 
ASSESSMENT and RECOVERY) modify modeled aircraft properties and actions. These 
modifications direct kill chain route selection. An example in the study is aircraft being 
routed for recovery upon minimum fuel or the aircraft’s destruction in the event of a 
BLUE aircraft catastrophic mishap. The following sections describe in detail the 
processes in each event and the aircraft actions that result at the conclusion of the event 
execution. 
1. Recurring Processes 
Four internal processes continuously evaluate modeled aircraft material 
conditions: fuel state monitoring, aircraft in-flight mechanical failure monitoring, aircraft 
scheduled maintenance interval monitoring and aircraft catastrophic mishap monitoring. 
a. Fuel State Monitoring 
The model determines aircraft current fuel state through the comparison of 
executed flight time versus aircraft type-dependent maximum sortie length. When aircraft 
flight time equals its maximum sortie duration, the aircraft is routed for recovery. 
b. Aircraft In-flight Mechanical Failure Monitoring 
Initial flight deck spotting assigns modeled aircraft a flight time until the 
occurrence of in-flight mechanical failure. The in-flight failure time is randomly 
generated based on an exponential distribution with a mean of the aircraft type-dependent 
MTBF. As the aircraft conducts flight operations, its executed flight time is continuously 
compared to the randomly assigned in-flight failure time. When flight time exceeds the 
in-flight failure time, the aircraft suffers a mechanical in-flight failure and is routed for 
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recovery and unscheduled maintenance. Aircraft completion of unscheduled maintenance 
generates a new randomly assigned in-flight failure time with the previously described 
random distribution. With the exception of the initial flight deck spotting, all random 
failure time reassignments occur at the completion of unscheduled maintenance. 
c. Schedule Maintenance Interval Monitoring 
During the simulation, aircraft cumulative executed flight time is compared to its 
type-dependent user defined scheduled maintenance interval property. When an aircraft’s 
cumulative flight time equals its scheduled maintenance interval, the aircraft is routed for 
recovery and scheduled maintenance. Upon completion of scheduled maintenance, the 
cumulative flight time counter resets to zero and the aircraft resumes flight operations 
until the cumulative flight clock again equals the defined scheduled maintenance interval. 
 
d. Catastrophic Mishap Monitoring 
Simulation initiation assigns modeled aircraft a flight time until the occurrence of 
a catastrophic mishap. The catastrophic mishap time is randomly generated based on an 
exponential distribution with a mean of the aircraft type-dependent mishap rate. As the 
aircraft conducts flight operations, its cumulative executed flight time is continuously 
compared to the randomly assigned mishap time. When flight time exceeds the mishap 
time, the aircraft suffers a catastrophic mishap, is destroyed and removed from the 
simulation. Figure 7 depicts the process for continuous aircraft monitoring between the 
surveillance and classification events. Arrows in blue indicate the standard routing that 
occurs when monitored values do not exceed thresholds. 
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Figure 7.  Model Continuous Aircraft Monitoring Process 
2. Kill Chain Event-Specific Processes 
Each sequence of the expanded kill chain selectively directs and modifies 
modeled aircraft via processes internal to the kill chain events. The following sections 
detail the processes in each kill chain event and its impact on the aircraft’s behavior or 
material condition. 
a. Model Initiation 
Model initiation creates aircraft available for kill chain execution based on user-
defined quantities. In the study, the number of RQ-21, MQ-8C and MH-60S aircraft 
varies based on the CONOPS selected for evaluation. BLUE aircraft creation assigns 
values for initial ordnance payloads, sortie duration, ordnance circular error probable 
(CEP), and ordnance probability of kill based on the user selected ordnance type 
(HELLFIRE or APKWS-II) and RED target dimensions. Additionally, the calculation of 
RED probability of kill based on RED ordnance CEP and BLUE aircraft type-dependent 
target dimensions is performed. Appendix D provides probability of kill calculation 
details.  
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b. Flight Deck Spotting 
Once created via simulation initiation, aircraft transition to an operationally ready 
state through the flight deck spotting event. Flight deck spotting represents the time and 
sequence of events required to move an aircraft from a storage location (air capable ship 
hangar) to the flight deck and the accomplishment of the aircraft’s material readiness via 
ordnance loading, fueling, and pre-flight maintenance actions. Processes internal to the 
flight deck spotting event are: 
 Ordnance payload set to maximum aircraft type-dependent loadout 
 Fuel loadout set to achieve established sortie duration 
The model incorporates aircraft type-dependent flight deck spotting duration 
variability through a randomly generated time with a triangular distribution having the 
following parameters: 
 Mean time: aircraft spotting duration 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(spotting duration) 
 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(spotting duration) 
c. Takeoff 
Model links route aircraft to TAKEOFF upon completion of flight deck spotting. 
The takeoff event initiates aircraft flight time calculations and fuel state, scheduled 
maintenance, mishap and in-flight failure monitoring. Takeoff event duration is aircraft 
type-dependent and the model introduces variability via a randomly generated time with a 
triangular distribution having the following parameters: 
 Mean time: aircraft takeoff duration 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(takeoff duration) 
 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(takeoff duration) 
d. Surveillance 
Within the SURVEILLANCE event, BLUE aircraft conduct searches via electro-
optical sensors and RED ships conduct unaided (naked eye) searches for BLUE aircraft.  
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Routing to surveillance assigns BLUE aircraft optimum search altitudes and sensor to 
target slant ranges based on BLUE sensor capabilities, imagery requirements and RED 
target dimensions for contact acquisition. Sections d.1 and d.2 detail the internal process 
calculations for BLUE and RED detection times.   
(1) Blue Detection Time 
The model calculates individual BLUE aircraft detection rates based on the 
sweepwidth of the BLUE sensor, the velocity of the BLUE aircraft and the size of the 
search area. The model adjusts the individual aircraft search rate for the number of RED 
and neutral ships present in the search area to determine a non-contact specific (RED or 
neutral contact) detection time. Continuous detection time is sampled from an 
exponential distribution with a mean of the individual aircraft calculated search time.  
The summation of individual aircraft search efforts determines a composite 
detection time and incorporates the ability for multiple BLUE aircraft to search 
simultaneously. Prior to the initiation of each surveillance event, composite detection 
recalculates based on the current number of BLUE aircraft simultaneously searching. 
Additionally, during the execution of a simulation, BLUE detection time adjusts for 
changes in the number of RED within the search area following the BLUE destruction of 
RED contacts.  
(2) Red Time to Detect BLUE 
Similar to BLUE detection time, RED time to detect BLUE is based on the 
quantity and visual sweepwidth of the RED vessels and the velocity and quantity of the 
BLUE aircraft conducting surveillance. RED visual sweepwidth is dependent on the 
dimensions, altitude and slant range of the BLUE aircraft conducting surveillance events. 
The summation of individual RED search efforts determines a composite mean RED 
detection time. Implementation of a continuous search model is performed through the 
use of an exponential distribution with a mean of the RED composite detection time. 
Appendix E provides equations for RED detection time and sweepwidth.   
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As depicted in Figure 8, the model compares the BLUE and RED detection times. 
If BLUE detection time is less than RED detection time, links route the BLUE aircraft to 
CLASSIFICATION (Section 2.e). If BLUE detection time is greater than RED detection 
time, the RED threat executes a weapons engagement against the BLUE aircraft. BLUE 
and RED detection times respond to the number of RED threats and the number of BLUE 
aircraft searching. BLUE detection time decreases with the inflow of additional BLUE 
aircraft into the SURVEILLANCE event and increases with RED threat destruction and 
as BLUE aircraft exit SURVEILLANCE via linkage to CLASSIFICATION.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Model Surveillance Event 
e. Classification 
Upon the BLUE detection of a surface contact that is uncontested by a RED 
weapon engagement, a BLUE aircraft is routed to the CLASSIFICATION event. 
Classification performs the positive identification of the surface contact in order to 
discriminate RED from neutral contacts. Classification event processes adjust BLUE 
aircraft altitude and sensor to target slant range for contact classification and 
identification based on BLUE sensor capabilities, imagery requirements and RED target 
dimensions. Classification results in the determination that the contact is RED or neutral. 
Classification event duration is aircraft type-dependent and variability is introduced via a 
randomly generated time with a triangular distribution having the following parameters: 
 Mean time: aircraft classification duration 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(classification duration) 
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 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(classification duration) 
During the CLASSIFICATION event, BLUE aircraft are at risk to RED detection 
and weapon engagement. The model determines RED time to detect BLUE via a discrete 
calculation based on RED glimpse probability, field of view and scan rate. Appendix F 
presents equations for RED time to detect BLUE during the CLASSIFICATION event. 
BLUE classification time is compared to RED detection time. If BLUE classification 
time is less than RED time to detect BLUE, the BLUE aircraft is routed to WEAPON 
ENGAGEMENT. If BLUE classification time is greater than RED detection time the 
RED threat executes a weapon engagement against the BLUE aircraft. Figure 9 depicts 
the sequence of events and processes in the CLASSIFICATION event. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Model Classification Event 
Prior to route advancement, BLUE aircraft perform fuel state, in-flight 
mechanical failure, scheduled maintenance interval and mishap monitoring to filter out 
aircraft that require recovery and maintenance from further kill chain events. Aircraft that 
remain are re-routed to SURVEILLANCE upon the classification of the surface contact 
as neutral and routed to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT for surface contacts classified as 
RED. 
f. Weapon Engagement 
After classification of a surface contact as RED, model links route uncontested 
BLUE aircraft to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT for target prosecution. BLUE aircraft 
remain at previously assigned classification altitude and sensor to target slant range in the 
execution of weapon engagements. Weapon time of flight (TOF) and release times 
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determine weapon engagement durations. Weapon TOF calculations are ordnance 
velocity and slant range dependent and vary based on the type of ordnance employed. 
Weapon release times are aircraft type-dependent. The model introduces weapon 
engagement event duration variability via a randomly generated time with a triangular 
distribution having the following parameters: 
 Mean time: Weapon TOF + aircraft weapon release time 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(Weapon TOF + aircraft weapon release time) 
 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(Weapon TOF + aircraft weapon release time) 
Similar to CLASSIFICATION, BLUE aircraft are at risk to RED detection and weapon 
engagement during WEAPON ENGAGMENT. Figure 10 depicts the model comparison 
of BLUE weapon engagement times to RED detection and weapon engagement times in 
order to determine the “first shooter.” 
 
 
Figure 10.  Model Weapon Engagement Event 
Prior to route advancement, aircraft fuel state, in-flight mechanical failure, 
scheduled maintenance interval and mishap monitoring is performed to filter out aircraft 
that require recovery and maintenance from further kill chain events. Aircraft that remain 
are routed to ASSESSMENT. 
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g. Assessment 
The ASSESSMENT event performs battle damage assessments to determine the 
effectiveness of BLUE weapon engagements. BLUE assessment altitude and slant range 
is assigned, followed by the calculation of BLUE probability of kill. The model compares 
BLUE probability of kill to a randomly generated number with a uniform distribution 
between 0 and 1. If BLUE probability of kill is greater than the random number the result 
is a RED kill and model links route the BLUE aircraft to SURVEILLANCE following 
fuel, ordnance, scheduled maintenance, in-flight failure and mishap monitoring, repeating 
the kill chain sequence. If the BLUE probability of kill is less than the random number 
the model reroutes the BLUE aircraft to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT for additional 
weapons employment. BLUE ordnance type-dependent CEP and the RED target 
dimensions determine BLUE probability of kill (Adams pars. 2-3). Appendix D presents 
probability of kill calculations. 
BLUE assessment duration is aircraft type-dependent and the model introduces 
real world variability with a triangular distribution having the parameters: 
 Mean time: aircraft assessment time 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(aircraft assessment time) 
 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(aircraft assessment time) 
Similar to the RED threat interaction during WEAPON ENGAGEMENT, BLUE 
aircraft are at risk to RED weapon engagements during ASSESSMENT. If the BLUE 
aircraft is unsuccessful in killing the RED threat, the model compares BLUE assessment 
time to the RED detection and weapon time. If the BLUE assessment time is less than the 
RED time, the BLUE aircraft is rerouted to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT. If the BLUE 
time is greater than the RED time, the RED threat executes a weapon engagement against 
the BLUE aircraft. Figure 11 depicts the processes in the ASSESSMENT event. 
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Figure 11.  Model Assessment Event 
h. RED Weapon Engagements 
Similar to BLUE weapons engagements, a comparison of RED probability of kill 
to a randomly assigned number with a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 determines 
the success of RED weapons engagements versus BLUE aircraft. Successful RED 
weapons engagements occur when RED probability of kill is greater than the random 
number, resulting in a BLUE KILL. Unsuccessful RED weapons engagement occurs 
when RED probability of kill is less than the random number and route the BLUE aircraft 
to RE-ATTACK. RED ordnance CEP and the BLUE aircraft type-dependent target 
dimensions determine RED probability of kill. Appendix D presents the equations for 





Figure 12.   Model RED Weapon Engagement 
i. Re-attack 
The model incorporates the RE-ATTACK event to account for actions that occur 
after an unsuccessful RED weapons engagement of BLUE. Based on the time of the RED 
attack against BLUE, the model determines the required actions in the RE-ATTACK 
event. Section i.1 and i.2 and Figure 13 describe and depict the processes in the RE-
ATTACK event. 
(1) Unsuccessful RED weapons engagement against BLUE during 
SURVEILLANCE 
The comparison of two times determines the actions after an unsuccessful RED 
weapons engagement during BLUE SURVEILLANCE. 
 BLUE – based on RED’s engagement and miss of BLUE, BLUE’s time to 
classify RED is reduced. The model randomly assigns a BLUE quick 
classification time with a triangular distribution having the parameters 
(mean: 0.4*aircraft classification time, min: 0.2*mean(aircraft 
classification time), max: 0.6*mean(aircraft classification time)). 
 RED – based on RED’s knowledge of BLUE’s position, RED’s time to re-
engage BLUE is reduced. RED’s re-engagement time is the summation of 
RED re-acquire time plus RED weapon time. The model randomly assigns 
RED re-acquire time based on RED detection time during BLUE 
classification and applies a triangular distribution with the parameters 
(mean: 0.3*RED detection time during BLUE classification, min: 
0.2*mean(RED detection time during BLUE classification), max: 
0.4*mean(RED detection time during BLUE classification)). The model 
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sums RED re-acquire time with RED weapon time to determine RED re-
engagement time. 
If BLUE quick classification time is less than RED re-engagement time, the 
model routes the BLUE aircraft to BLUE WEAPON. If BLUE quick classification time 
exceeds RED re-engagement time the RED threat executes an additional weapon 
engagement against the BLUE aircraft. 
(2) Unsuccessful RED weapons engagement during BLUE 
CLASSIFICATION, WEAPON ENGAGEMENT or ASSESSMENT 
The comparison of two times determines the actions after an unsuccessful RED 
weapons engagement during BLUE CLASSIFICATION, WEAPON ENGAGEMENT or 
ASSESSMENT. 
 BLUE–based on BLUE’s knowledge of RED’s position and RED’s 
engagement of BLUE, BLUE’s time to re-acquire and engage RED is 
reduced. The model randomly assigns BLUE quick attack time based on a 
triangular distribution with the parameters (mean: 0.3*BLUE 
classification time, min: 0.2*mean(BLUE classification time), max: 
0.4*mean(BLUE classification time)).  
 RED–the summation of RED re-acquire time plus RED weapon time 
(Section i.1) 
Similar to the time comparison results in Section i.1, if BLUE time is less than 
RED time, the model routes BLUE aircraft to WEAPON ENGAGEMENT. If BLUE time 
exceeds RED time, the RED threat executes an additional weapon engagement against 








Figure 13.  Model Re-Attack Event 
j. Recovery 
Upon weapon payload depletion, minimum fuel state, in-flight mechanical failure 
flight time equaling scheduled maintenance interval or the termination of day-time flight 
operations, the model routes BLUE aircraft to RECOVERY. BLUE recovery duration is 
aircraft type-dependent and the model introduces real world variability with a triangular 
distribution having the parameters: 
 Mean time: aircraft recovery time 
 Minimum time: 0.75 * mean(aircraft recovery time) 
 Maximum time: 1.5 * mean(aircraft recovery time) 
k. Maintenance Activities 
Following recovery, the model routes BLUE aircraft to the appropriate 
maintenance activity based on recovery conditions. Ordnance depletion of minimum fuel 
state routes BLUE aircraft to POST FLIGHT MAINTENANCE. In-flight mechanical 
failure routes BLUE aircraft to UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE. When BLUE 
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aircraft flight time exceeds a scheduled maintenance interval, the model routes BLUE 
aircraft to SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE. The duration of the maintenance activities is 
aircraft type-dependent and the model incorporates variability through a triangular 
distribution with a mean of the associate mean maintenance activity time, a minimum of 
0.75 the associated mean maintenance activity time, and a maximum of 1.5 the associated 
mean maintenance activity time. All maintenance activities refuel and rearm BLUE 
aircraft.  
After recovered at the conclusion of daylight flight operation, the model compares 
the BLUE aircraft cumulative flight time to the aircraft type-dependent scheduled 
maintenance interval. If the cumulative flight time is within 5 hours of the maintenance 
interval, the model routes the aircraft to SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE in order to 
increase the aircraft’s available flight time for flight operations the subsequent day. 
Additionally, upon recovery the model evaluates aircraft to determine if multiple 
conditions initiated recovery. If multiple conditions exist, the model prioritizes BLUE 
aircraft maintenance in the following order; SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, 
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, and POST FLIGHT MAINTENANCE. For 
example, BLUE aircraft recovery due to an in-flight mechanical failure and a scheduled 
maintenance interval, results in the aircraft routing to SCHEDULED MAINTENACE 
where the model executes scheduled maintenance and the repair of the in-flight 
mechanical failure. 
l. Unmanned Vehicle Control Limitations 
The designed capacity of the unmanned aircraft ground control station (GCS) 
limits the quantity of unmanned aircraft conducting flight operations. The model 
incorporates this constraint through monitoring the number of BLUE unmanned aircraft 
airborne. Within the TAKEOFF event, each unmanned aircraft takeoff increments a 
counter. Conversely, within the MAINTENANCE events, upon a BLUE unmanned 
aircraft catastrophic mishap or a successful RED weapon engagement against a BLUE 
unmanned aircraft the model decrements the counter. The counter total is compared to the 
GCS control limit. The model restricts additional unmanned aircraft takeoffs when the 
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counter equals or exceeds the GCS control limit. The count’s reduction below the GCS 
control limit de-activates the takeoff restriction.  
3. Joint Engagement Simulation Modifications 
Section G.2 describes the kill chain event sequence for independent aircraft target 
detection, classification and prosecution. In order to simulate multiple aircraft joint kill 
chain execution, the model incorporates additional logic and events to enable aircraft to 
perform as “hunters” or “hunters and killers.” “Hunters” are unarmed aircraft and 
function solely as surface contact detection and classification platforms while “hunter and 
killers” are equipped with on-board ordnance and perform detection, classification and 
weapon engagement functions. Sections 3.a details the additional design features to 
incorporate joint engagements.  
a. Pre and Post Surveillance Routing 
BLUE aircraft routing pre and post-SURVEILLANCE is based on the following 
conditions. 
(1) Unarmed BLUE aircraft – following detection the model routes unarmed 
aircraft to CLASSIFICATION. If CLASSIFICATION yields a positive 
identification of a neutral contact, the model re-routes the unarmed aircraft 
to SURVEILLANCE. If CLASSIFICATION yields a positive 
identification of a RED contact, the unarmed aircraft maintains target 
tracking until join-up and target hand-off to an armed BLUE aircraft.  
(2) Armed BLUE aircraft pre-surveillance (Figure 14) - if an unarmed BLUE 
aircraft has positively identified a RED contact, the armed aircraft 
bypasses SURVEILLANCE and CLASSSIFICATION and the model 
routes the armed BLUE aircraft to assume the WEAPON 
ENGAGEMENT and ASSESSMENT functions for the unarmed aircraft’s 
identified RED target. Following the target hand-off, the unarmed BLUE 
aircraft resumes surveillance. If an unarmed BLUE aircraft has not 





Figure 14.  Model Pre-Surveillance Joint Engagement 
(3) Armed BLUE aircraft post-surveillance (Figure 15) – similar to section 
(a.2), armed BLUE aircraft bypass CLASSIFICATION and perform 
WEAPON ENGAGEMENT and ASSESSMENT functions in the event an 
unarmed BLUE aircraft positively identifies a RED target. Following the 
target hand-off, the unarmed aircraft resumes surveillance. If an unarmed 
BLUE aircraft has not identified a RED contact, the model routes armed 
aircraft upon completion of SURVEILLANCE to CLASSIFICATION. 
The model prioritizes the prosecution of RED targets classified by 
unarmed BLUE aircraft to minimize the exposure of unarmed BLUE 













IV. RESULTS  
This chapter introduces the results from the simulation of the designed CONOPS. 
We present the results in terms of achieved measurements of effectiveness and 
measurement of performance for each CONOPS evaluated. We then compare and 
perform causal analysis of the CONOPS relative performance.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study tested four CONOPS and six aircraft compositions to determine an 
efficient combination of manned and unmanned aircraft in the execution of FAC/FIAC 
ASUW kill chains tested four CONOPS and six variations. Table 17 lists the evaluated 
CONOPS and the associated aircraft quantities and tasks. We collected aircraft 
performance, maintenance, mishap, sensor, ordnance and cost data in support of accurate 
aircraft modeling. The study estimates unavailable sensor performance parameters due to 
classification or proprietary rights through the implementation of equations and 
calculations obtained from the Institute of Defense Analyses (Koretsky, Taylor and 
Nicoll 13–19), Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems: Modeling and Performance 
Prediction (Leachtenauer 32) and Electro-Optical Tracking Systems Considerations 
(Downey and Stockum 82–83). We determined RED visual search parameters with the 
aid of the U.S. Army Night Vision Integrated Performance Model software (U.S. Army, 
NV-IPM V1.2), A Model for Visual Detection of Aircraft by Ground Observers (Poe 6–
8), and Visual Search Processes of Coast Guard Aircrewmen (Jones 25). Appendix G 


















3 3 0 
MQ-8: RED detection, 
classification and targeting 
MH-60: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via HELLFIRE) 
CONOPS 
1B 
6 0 0 
MH-60: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via HELLFIRE) 
CONOPS 
2A 
3 3 0 
MQ-8: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
MH-60: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
CONOPS 
2B 
6 0 0 
MH-60: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
CONOPS 3 4 0 6 
RQ-21: RED detection, 
classification and targeting 
MH-60: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
CONOPS 4 0 3 9 
RQ-21: RED detection, 
classification and targeting 
MQ-8: RED detection, 
classification, targeting and 
prosecution (via APKWS II) 
 
B. RESULTS 
We utilized SIMIO to simulate 2000 replications per CONOPS for 12000 total 
replications with a combined run time of 152 minutes. We explored numbers of 
replications exceeding 2000 with no impact on the estimated results. Each replication 
simulated 30 days of 12 hours of daylight flight operations per day for the CONOPS 
determined quantities of aircraft. We then compared the mean measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) and measure of performance (MOP) achieved by each CONOPS in order to select 
the most efficient aircraft combination for the execution of FAC/FIAC ASUW kill 
chains. Table 18 presents the mean and standard error (SE) for the MOP and MOE 




Table 18.   CONOPS MOP and MOE Performance 
CONOPS 




































2.4 0.038 19.81 0.030 4.5 0.105 0.9 0.012 4.8 0.087 
RQ-21A 9 
2B MH-60S 6 3.2 0.062 19.97 0.008 5.2 0.125 0.5 0.004 1.6 0.043 
1B MH-60S 6 3.3 0.062 19.97 0.008 5.2 0.124 0.5 0.004 1.6 0.042 
2A 
MH-60S 3 








1. MOP—Cost per RED Kill  
Mean cost per RED kill varied from a minimum of 2.0 $M FY16 for CONOPS 3 
to a maximum of 5.0 $M FY16 for CONOPS 1A.   From the results presented in Table 
19, across all tested aircraft configurations a maximum of 0.8 percent difference exists in 
the quantity of RED kills, therefore the primary determinate of cost per RED kill is the 
CONOPS total cost. Total cost is composed of three elements; cost due to aircraft 
attrition, aircraft operating and ordnance expenditure costs. Cost due to BLUE aircraft 
attrition accounts for 67.2 to 79.5% of total costs across all tested CONOPS. Operating 
costs contributes between 19.7 and 30.9% to total cost and ordnance accounts for 0.8 to 
3.2% of total costs. Based on these results, the cost due to BLUE aircraft attrition is the 
most significant influence on the CONOPS MOP.   
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(1.9%) RQ-21A 6 
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(2.1%) MQ-8C 3 
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a. CONOP 1A—MH-60S (HELLFIRE) and MQ-8C 
With a mean cost per kill of 5.0 $M FY16 and in the 2000 replications a 
maximum cost per kill of 18.9 and minimum of 1.2 $M the performance of CONOPS 1A 
ranks last among all tested aircraft configurations.   Simulation of CONOPS 1A produced 
the highest average cost per kill and the second lowest value for the mean number of 
RED killed. The inability for unarmed MQ-8C to destroy RED, combined with the high 
APUC for all aircraft operated in the CONOPS resulted in a 286% increase in mean 
BLUE attrition costs and a 0.5% decrease in mean number of RED killed compared to the 
best performing CONOPS. CONOPS 1A also suffers the second highest mean BLUE 
attrition cost 77.1 $M FY16 despite a moderate average of 2.5 BLUE losses from RED 
weapons engagements due to an average aircraft APUC of 28 $M FY16. Figure 16 
depicts the distribution of BLUE kills for CONOPS 1A.  98.7% of the CONOPS 1A 
simulations resulted in a cost per RED kill of less than 10.0 $M FY16. Figure 17 depicts 
the distribution of the cost per RED kill below 10 $M FY16 for CONOPS 1A. 
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Figure 17.  CONOPS 1A Cost per Red Kill 
b. CONOPS 1B—MH-60S (HELLFIRE) 
CONOPS 1B achieved a cost per RED kill with a mean value of 3.3 $M FY16, 
maximum cost per kill value of 11.1 $M and minimum of 0.9 $M. CONOPS 1B’s 
inclusion of only MH-60S significantly affects the cost per RED kill. We analyzed the 
cost per RED kill against the distribution of BLUE kills for CONOPS 1B (Figure 18) and 
determined that the cost per RED kill increases incrementally with each BLUE aircraft 
loss.   23% of the simulated runs resulted in zero BLUE aircraft losses and a mean cost 
per RED kill of approximately 1.0 $M FY16.  32% resulted in one BLUE loss and a 
mean cost per kill of approximately 2.5 $M and 23% resulted in two BLUE losses and a 
mean cost per kill of approximately 4.0 $M FY16.  99.4% of all simulations resulted in a 
cost per RED kill less than 10 $M FY16.     
The incorporation of only MH-60S in CONOPS 1B resulted in a reduction of 
BLUE aircraft losses. The MH-60S ability to execute defensive maneuvering, onboard 
countermeasures and greater system redundancy results in a reduced attrition rate due to 
RED weapons engagements compared to the studied unmanned aircraft. Simulation of 
CONOPS 1B yielded an average of 1.6 BLUE losses due to RED weapons. Despite the 
reduced attrition, an average APUC of 28.5 $M FY16 limits the ability to achieve a low 
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Figure 18.  CONOPS 1B: BLUE Kills 
 
 
Figure 19.  CONOPS 1B Cost per RED Kill 
c. CONOPS 2A—MH-60S (APKWS-II) and MQ-8C (APKWS-II) 
The cost per RED kill of CONOPS 2A demonstrates the potential impact of future 
armed MQ-8C. Equipped with APKWS-II, the MH-60S and MQ-8C in CONOPS 2A 
resulted in a mean cost per RED kill of 4.9 $M FY16, a maximum of 11.5 $M FY16 and a 
minimum of 1.2 $M. These values represent a 2.0% percent reduction in the mean cost per 
kill and a 39.2% reduction in the maximum cost per kill compared to CONOPS 1A with 
unarmed MQ-8C aircraft. The ability for MQ-8C aircraft to destroy RED threats, results in 
fewer uncontested BLUE-RED engagements and a 0.2% increase in the mean number of 
RED killed. With the increased weapon engagements CONOPS 2A suffers a 4.0% higher 
mean number of BLUE kills than CONOPS 1A. The BLUE-RED weapons engagements of 
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in the number of mean BLUE kills. Figure 20 depicts the distribution of CONOPS 2A BLUE 
kills.  99.0% of simulation replications resulted in a cost per RED kill of less than 10 $M 
FY16. Figure 21 depicts the distribution of cost per RED kill for CONOPS 2A. 
 
 
Figure 20.  CONOPS 2A BLUE Kills 
 
 
Figure 21.  CONOPS 2A Cost per RED Kill 
d. CONOPS 2B–MH-60S (APKWS-II) 
Through analysis of the CONOPS 2B MOP, we determine the value of the 
APKWS-II weapon system for the MH-60S. CONOPS 2B achieved a mean cost per RED 
kill of 3.2 $M FY16, a 3.0% reduction from that of CONOPS 1B composed of MH-60S 
equipped with HELLFIRE missiles. The replacement of HELLFIREs with APKWS-II 
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Table 20.   CONOPS Ordnance Expenditure Costs 
CONOPS 
Aircraft Ordnance 
Type # Type 
Mean Expended 
Cost ($M FY16) 
1A 
MH-60S 3 HELLFIRE 
2.1 
MQ-8C 3 N/A 
1B MH-60S 6 HELLFIRE 2.1 
2A 
MH-60S 3 APKWS 
0.8 
MQ-8C 3 APKWS 
2B MH-60S 6 APKWS 0.8 
3 
MH-60S 4 APKWS 
0.8 
RQ-21A 6 N/A 
4 
MQ-8C 3 APKWS 
0.8 
RQ-21A 9 N/A 
 
CONOPS 2B results in a maximum mean cost per RED kill of 11.1 and a 
minimum mean cost per kill of 0.8 $M FY16. Figure 22 displays distribution of 
CONOPS 2B BLUE kills. Based on the inclusion of only MH-60S aircraft, CONOPS 2B 
demonstrates an incremental increase in mean cost per RED kill similar to the behavior of 
CONOPS 1B. 99.0% of all simulations resulted in a cost per RED kill of under 10 $M 
FY16. Figure 23 depicts the cost per RED kill for CONOPS 2B. 
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Figure 23.  CONOPS 2B Cost per RED Kill 
e. CONOPS 3 
CONOPS 3 is the first modeled aircraft configuration that includes the RQ-21A. 
With a mean cost per RED kill of 2.0 $M FY16, maximum of 9.7 $M and minimum cost 
per kill of 0.7 $M FY16 CONOPS 3 outperforms all other aircraft configurations in the 
study. CONOPS 3 is the clearest illustration of the effect of BLUE attrition on cost per 
RED kill. Simulation of CONOPS 3 results in an average value of 4.0 BLUE kills, the 
study’s second highest value. Despite approximately twice the mean number of BLUE 
kills of other CONOPS, the RQ-21A APUC of 4.3 $M FY16 is 88% lower than other 
evaluated aircraft and results in a study low BLUE mean attrition cost of 27.0 $M FY16.   
The CONOPS pairing of RQ-21A and MH-60S achieves an average of 19.95 RED kills. 
Figure 24 presents the distribution of BLUE kills for CONOPS 3.  100% of simulations 
resulted in a mean cost per RED kill below 10 $M FY16. Figure 25 depicts the 
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Figure 24.  CONOPS 3 BLUE Kills 
 
 
Figure 25.  CONOPS 3 Cost per RED Kill 
f. CONOPS 4–MQ-8C (APKWS-II) and RQ-21A 
Composed of MQ-8C and RQ-21A, CONOPS 4 is the only fully unmanned 
aircraft configuration modeled. CONOPS 4 resulted in an average cost per RED kill of 
2.4 $M FY16, a maximum of 10.6 $M, and a minimum cost per kill of 1.9 $M FY16. 
Composed of 75% RQ-21A, the mean cost per RED kill of CONOPS 4 benefits the 
study’s lowest average aircraft APUC of 10.1 $M. With an average aircraft APUC 27.7% 
lower than the second lowest value of 13.9 $M for CONOPS 3, CONOPS 2 achieves the 
second lowest mean cost per RED kill despite an average of 4.8 BLUE kills. Figure 26 
presents the CONOPS 4 distribution of BLUE kills.  100% of simulations result in a cost 
per RED kill less than 10 $M FY16. Figure 27 depicts the distribution of the cost per 






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$M FY16 





Figure 26.  CONOPS 4 BLUE Kills 
 
 
Figure 27.  CONOPS 4 Cost per RED Kill 
2. MOE #1: RED Kills 
The RED kills measure of effectiveness represents the ability of a CONOPS to 
destroy RED forces over a finite time period. To determine RED kills, we conducted 
2000 simulations of each CONOPS for a duration of 30 days and measured the quantity 
of RED remaining from an initial force of 20. The mean value for RED kills ranged from 
19.97 to 19.81. Despite the small 0.8% difference between the most effective and least 
effective CONOPS, analysis of the simulation-generated data determined that CONOPS 
quantity and percentage of ordnance carrying aircraft and BLUE aircraft survivability 
most significantly affect the number of RED kills. Table 21 presents RED kill data for the 
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2B MH-60S 6 100% 6 1.6 19.97 98.4% 80% 
1B MH-60S 6 100% 6 1.6 19.97 98.3% 80% 
3 
MH-60S 4 












25% 3 4.8 19.81 92.8% 40% 
RQ-21A 9 
 
a. Ordnance Carrying Aircraft 
The study determined that the CONOPS quantity of ordnance carrying aircraft 
contributed to RED kill performance.   Within the study the number of ordnance carrying 
aircraft varied from three (CONOPS 1A and 4) to six (CONOPS 1B, 2A and 2B). All 
CONOPS composed of greater than four ordnance carrying aircraft destroyed greater 
than an average of 19.88 of 20 RED threats. Simulation results indicate that for an 
operational duration of 30 days, quantities below four armed aircraft, as in CONOPS 1A 
and 4, there is a moderate reduction in BLUE’s ability to destroy RED forces. An 
improvement in RED kill performance due to an increased quantity of BLUE armed 
aircraft results from a higher percentage of BLUE and RED interactions that include 
BLUE weapons engagements and subsequent RED kills.  
b. Percentage of Ordnance Carrying Aircraft 
In conjunction with an increased quantity of BLUE armed aircraft, the percentage 
of armed aircraft within a CONOPS also affects number of RED killed. Composed of 
100% armed aircraft, CONOPS 1B, 2A, and 2B resulted in three of the top four mean kill 
rates (RED killed/20). Conversely, CONOPS 1A and 4, composed of only 50% and 25% 
armed aircraft recorded the two lowest values for average RED kills. As RED forces 
engage and destroy BLUE aircraft at random, a higher percentage of BLUE armed 
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aircraft improves the likelihood that remaining BLUE aircraft are capable of weapons 
employment against RED threats. 
c. BLUE Survivability 
CONOPS 1B and 2B demonstrate the effect of BLUE attrition on the number of 
RED killed. CONOPS 1B and 2B with study-low mean BLUE kill quantities of 1.6 
aircraft achieved the highest average number of RED kills. Increased BLUE survivability 
allows BLUE aircraft to execute a higher number of kill chains and achieve an increased 
number of RED kills. Increased BLUE attrition, as demonstrated by CONOPS 1A and 4, 
resulted in a lower number of RED kills. 
d. Probability of RED Annihilation and Minimum Percent RED Killed 
The study determined that an increased quantity, percentage and survivability of 
BLUE armed aircraft result in a higher probability of destroying all RED and increase the 
minimum percentage of RED killed in the simulation replications. Over 98% of all 
CONOPS 1B and 2B simulations resulted in the annihilation of RED forces and a 
minimum of 80% of RED forces killed in the replications. 
3. MOE #2: Time Till 50% RED Attrition 
The time until 50% RED attrition measures the ability of BLUE forces to 
eliminate the combat effectiveness of RED forces.  2000 simulations of each CONOPS 
resulted in a range of 4.5 to 17.0 hours. Analysis of the results determined that in-flight 
ordnance availability and the ordnance capacity of the aircraft configurations affect the 
performance of the CONOPS.   While the study individually addresses these factors, the 
simulation results indicate an inter-dependency and collective influence of the factors on 
the time until 50% RED attrition. Table 22 presents the mean values of time until 50% 
RED attrition for all successful attempts and associated metrics ranked in descending 
order of time until 50% RED attrition.  
  
 78 



























Type # Hours Hours 









14 4.7 0.0% 48.8 2.1 
RQ-21A 6 
2B MH-60S 6 21 5.2 0.0% 33.7 2.1 
1B MH-60S 6 21 5.2 0.0% 36.7 2.1 
2A 
MH-60S 3 




10.5 17.0 0.2% 153.0 3.5 
MQ-8C 3 
 
a. Ordnance Carrying Aircraft 
An increased quantity of BLUE armed aircraft reduces the mean time until 50% 
RED attrition. Simulation of CONOPS 3, 4, 2B, 2A and 1B resulted in an average time 
until 50% attrition of less than 5.0 hours, or within the first day of flight operations. 
Configured with a minimum of three armed aircraft each CONOPS maintained the ability 
to expeditiously prosecute RED targets upon classification. A distinct disparity is 
observed for CONOPS 1A with a mean time until 50% RED attrition of 17.0 hours due to 
its low in-flight ordnance availability, determined by the quantity and average sortie 
duration of the CONOPS armed aircraft.  
b. In-flight Ordnance Availability 
Despite being equipped with three BLUE armed aircraft, CONOPS 1A achieved a 
study-low mean time until 50% RED attrition of 17.0 hours due a lack in-flight ordnance 
availability. Quantity and average sortie length of ordnance carrying aircraft determine 
in-flight ordnance availability. Configured with three armed MH-60S and an average 
aircraft sortie length of 3.5 hours, CONOPS 1A generates an in-flight ordnance 
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availability of 10.5 hours, compared to the 21 hours of ordnance availability provided by 
the CONOPS 1B six MH-60S. The reduced ordnance availability increases the duration 
between BLUE weapon engagements and the mean time until 50% attrition. Configured 
with nine RQ-21s, CONOPS 4 achieves a mean time until 50% attrition of 4.5 hours due 
to significantly decreased surveillance durations based on the search effort contributed by 
the RQ-21s. 
c. Failure to Achieve 50% RED Attrition 
All CONOPS resulted in high rates of success for achievement of 50% RED 
attrition with all CONOPS succeeding in over 99% of simulations. The small percentage 
of failures experienced by CONOPS 1A and 4 resulted in replications where BLUE 
casualties affected all ordnance carrying aircraft. Increased quantities of BLUE armed 
aircraft prevented similar behavior in the other studied CONOPS. 
d. Maximum and Minimum 50% RED Attrition Times 
Simulation of all CONOPS resulted in comparable minimum times until 50% 
RED attrition with a maximum value of 3.5 hours for CONOPS 1 and minimum value of 
2.0 hours for CONOPS 2A. Minimum 50% RED attrition times represent simulation runs 
without BLUE attrition and enable full aircraft and ordnance availability to reduce the 
time required for kill chain execution. 
The CONOPS maximum times until 50% RED attrition vary significantly. With 
the highest quantities of aircraft, CONOPS 1B and 2B resulted in the lowest simulation 
replication maximum 50% attrition time of less than 37 hours. Configured with MH-60S 
the CONOPS benefit from the highest percentage of armed aircraft and the most 
survivable aircraft.  
Simulation of CONOPS 3 and 4 resulted in maximum 50% RED attrition times of 
48.8 and 51.4 hours, respectively. Configured with 10 and 12 aircraft, CONOPS 3 and 4 
utilize the sorties generated by the RQ-21s to rapidly locate and classify RED threats and 
therefore more effectively employ the armed BLUE aircraft in target prosecution. 
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Configured with three armed MH-60S, a study-wide low value for in-flight 
ordnance availability and a significantly increased requirement for BLUE aircraft 
recovery and refueling, CONOPS 1A resulted in the highest replication maximum time 
until 50% RED attrition. One in 2000 simulations of CONOPS 1A resulted in the loss of 
two BLUE armed aircraft and the replication maximum 50% RED attrition time of 153.0 
hours.  
4. MOE #3: Mean BLUE detection time 
BLUE detection time is a measurement of the effectiveness of a CONOPS to 
detect both neutral and RED surface contacts. Lower detection time results in more 
expedient classification of RED threats and therefore the accelerated engagement and 
destruction of RED forces from the AO. We conduct 2000 simulations per CONOPS to 
achieve a BLUE detection rate ranging from one detection every 0.6 to 1.1 hours across 
all evaluated CONOPS. Analysis of the simulation data discovered average search 
velocity and quantity of BLUE aircraft have the most significant influence on mean 
BLUE detection time. Table 23 presents the mean, maximum and minimum BLUE 
detection times for all studied CONOPS.  
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Type # Kts Hours Hours Hours 
2B MH-60S 6 75 0.5 1.1 0.3 
1B MH-60S 6 75 0.5 1.1 0.3 
2A 
MH-60S 3 












67.5 1.1 2.4 0.4 
MQ-8C 3 
 
a. Average Search Velocity 
CONOPS 1B and 2B demonstrate the effect of average search velocity on mean 
BLUE detection time. With a study-high average search velocity of 75 knots, CONOPS 
1B and 2B generate increased search effort and a reduced mean BLUE detection time. 
With a reduced average search speed of 67.5 knots, CONOPS 2A achieved an average 
detection time of 0.7 hours.  
b. Aircraft Quantity 
Simulation of CONOPS 3 and 4, resulted in a mean detection time of 0.8 and 0.9 
hours, respectively, a 33.3% decline from the performance of the best CONOPS. 
Configured with 10 and 12 aircraft, CONOPS 3 and 4 generated sufficient cumulative 
search effort despite an approximate 17% reduction in average search speed from 
CONOPS 1B and 2B. CONOPS 1A significantly underperformed all other CONOPS. 
Affected by a study-wide high average BLUE attrition rate of 46.2%, CONOPS 1A 
generated the minimum cumulative search effort and resulted in a mean BLUE detection 
time of 1.1 hours. 
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V. EXPERIMENTATION AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the impact of BLUE aircraft attrition, we analyzed the simulation results 
to determine the kill chain events in which BLUE aircraft demonstrate the most 
significant vulnerability to RED weapons engagements. We determined that 72% percent 
of BLUE aircraft losses due to RED weapon engagements occur during the BLUE 
CLASSIFICATION event and 28% occur when BLUE aircraft maintain classification 
altitudes and slant ranges in the BLUE WEAPON ENGAGEMENT event. The 
CLASSIFICATION event corresponds with the minimum kill chain flight-profile 
altitudes and slant ranges due to the imagery requirements in support of RED vessel 
classification and the greatest BLUE exposure to the RED weapons envelope. As the 
BLUE aircraft sensor capabilities determine the CLASSIFICATION altitude and slant 
ranges, we experimented with improved sensor capabilities and the subsequent increases 
in CLASSIFICATION altitudes and slant ranges in order to determine the impact on 
BLUE aircraft attrition and cost per RED kill. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Sensor capability improvements affect BLUE survivability through an increased 
distance between the BLUE aircraft and the RED weapons envelope and through the 
reduction in RED’s ability to visually detect BLUE. As discussed in Chapter 3 Section 
G.2.e, RED’s ability and time to visual detect BLUE during the classification event is 
determined by RED’s discrete glimpse probability of detection. An increase in BLUE’s 
distance from RED reduces the glimpse probability and increases the RED time to detect 
BLUE. This improves the likelihood that the BLUE aircraft will classify and engage the 
RED threat before the RED threat can utilize its weapons against the BLUE aircraft. 
In order to calculate the impact of sensor capability improvement on the RED 
glimpse probability of detection we utilized the U.S. Army Night Vision Integrated 
Performance Model software (U.S. Army, NV-IPM V1.2) to evaluate adjusted 
probability of detection values for 10% incremental increases in the classification slant 
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range up to 100% of all studied aircraft. The projected size of the target aircraft affects 
the rate of RED glimpse probability decrease. As illustrated in Figure 28, the glimpse 
probabilities of the studied aircraft decrease at varying rates. The largest aircraft, the MH-
60S, decreases at the slowest rate. Slightly smaller than the MH-60S, the glimpse 
probability of the MQ-8C exhibits an increased decay rate. The glimpse probability of the 
smallest aircraft in the study, the RQ-21A, decreases at a rapid rate as the range from the 
RED threat increases. Figure 28 displays the calculated RED glimpse probability 




Figure 28.  RED Glimpse Probability of Detection versus Sensor Range 
Increase 
Based on the adjusted RED glimpse probability of detection values and increased 
BLUE classification altitude and slant ranges, we executed 120,000 simulations to collect 
adjusted cost per RED kill and BLUE kill values for each 10% increment in sensor 
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As presented in Figure 29, incremental sensor range increases result in significant 
mean cost per RED kill jumps at 10%, 40% and 100% sensor improvements based on 
reduced BLUE kills. Figure 30, depicts the impact of sensor improvement on the number 
of BLUE kills for all evaluated CONOPS. CONOPS 3 consistently outperforms all other 
CONOPS, with the exception of the 10% to 40% sensor improvement range when 
reduced MQ-8C attrition results in the superior performance of CONOPS 4. This analysis 
is performed under the assumption that the evaluated sensor improvement are cost-
neutral and therefore do not affect the aircraft APUC. 
 
 

















Sensor Improvement and Slant Range Increase 









Figure 30.  Mean BLUE Kills versus Sensor Improvement  
1. 10% Sensor Improvement 
The fully unmanned CONOPS 4 delivers the lowest cost per RED kill with a 10% 
sensor improvement. The 10% increase in sensor capability enables the MQ-8C 
classification altitude to exceed the RED SAM threat envelope altitude by 120 meters. 
The altitude separation eliminates the RED weapons exposure of the MQ-8C. All BLUE 
losses due to RED weapons engagement affect the RQ-21A of CONOPS 4 and result in a 
BLUE attrition cost 57.7% less than the performance of the next best CONOPS.  
The MQ-8C exit from the RED threat envelope combined with moderate 
decreases in the RED glimpse probability for the RQ-21, result in significantly decreased 
mean BLUE attrition for CONOPS 1A, 2A and 4. Marginal reductions in RED glimpse 
probability for MH-60S aircraft result in minimal BLUE attrition and cost per RED kill 
effects on CONOPS 1B, 2B and 3.   
A 10% sensor improvement also marks the first event where BLUE attrition costs 
no longer dictate cost per RED kill across all CONOPS. In all previous results, BLUE 


















Sensor Improvement and Slant Range Increase 








greatest influence on cost per RED kill. A 10% sensor improvement removes the losses 
of MQ-8 aircraft to RED weapons. This enables the MQ-8 aircraft to execute increased 
flight hours and generate increased operating costs. As a result, operating costs constitute 
52.8% of the total cost for CONOPS 4 Table 24 presents the mean and standard error 
(SE) for BLUE kill and cost per RED kill for a 10% increase in sensor capability.
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Mean BLUE Kills 
Baseline 
 












SE # of aircraft # of aircraft SE 
4 
MQ-8C 3 












5.0 2.7 0.041 2.5 0.7 0.022 
MQ-8C 3 
2B MH-60S 6 3.2 3.2 0.066 1.6 1.6 0.045 
1B MH-60S 6 3.3 3.3 0.064 1.6 1.6 0.044 
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2. 40% Sensor Improvement 
Simulation with a 40% sensor improvement restored CONOPS 3 as the most 
efficient aircraft configuration. With the sensor improvement, the MH-60S classification 
altitude exceeds the RED SAM envelope maximum altitude by 80 meters, eliminates all 
BLUE kills from CONOPS 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B and removes MH-60S kills from 
CONOPS 3. The most significant cost per RED kill reduction occurs in CONOPS 1B and 
2B due to their percentage of MH-60S aircraft. The 40% sensor improvement reduces the 
CONOPS 2B and 1B mean cost per RED kill to 0.7 and 1.1 $M FY16, respectively.   
Similar to the results with a 10% sensor improvement, the operating and ordnance 
costs differences of CONOPS 2B and 1A exert a greater influence than BLUE attrition 
costs in the cost per RED kill calculations. Across all CONOPS, operating costs outweigh 
attrition costs. Despite remaining RQ-21A losses to RED weapons, CONOPS 3 
outperforms CONOPS 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B with no BLUE kills, due to a 27.0% lower 
operating cost per flight hour for the RQ-21A compared to the average operating cost of 
the MH-60S and MQ-8C. Table 25 presents the mean and standard error (SE) of the cost 
per RED kill based on a 40% sensor improvement.   


















SE $M FY16 SE 
3 
MH-60S 4 
0.7 0.006 4.0 0.045 12.5 0.023 
RQ-21A 6 
2B MH-60S 6 1.0 0.005 0 0.0 18.4 0.030 
1B MH-60S 6 1.1 0.005 0 0.0 18.4 0.031 
4 
MQ-8C 3 








1.8 0.026 0 0.0 23.8 0.028 
MQ-8C 3 
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3. 100% Sensor Improvement 
100% sensor improvement marks the final significant change in cost per RED 
kill. A 100% sensor improvement results in the RQ-21A classification altitude and slant 
range exceeding the RED SAM envelope maximum altitude and range. This reduction 
eliminates all BLUE losses due to RED weapons engagements. With the highest in-flight 
catastrophic failure rate of 1 per 1000 flight hours, the mean cost per RED kill of 
CONOPS 3 and 4 decrease by only 0.5 and 0.7 percent based on mean BLUE attrition 
costs between 98% and 50% higher than non-RQ-21 configured CONOPS. Based on the 
mishap driven attrition cost and eliminate of BLUE kills, sensor improvements in excess 
of 100% fail to significantly affect the cost per RED kill of the evaluated CONOPS. 
Table 26 presents the mean and standard error (SE) of the cost per RED kill based on a 
100% sensor improvement. 































0.7 0.004 0 0.0 0.2 0.080 12.4 0.023 
RQ-21A 6 
2B MH-60S 6 1.0 0.005 0 0.0 0.3 0.094 18.4 0.031 
1B MH-60S 6 1.1 0.005 0 0.0 0.3 0.094 18.4 0.031 
4 
MQ-8C 3 












D. SENSOR COST BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS  
Section C demonstrates the effect on sensor improvement on cost per RED kill in 
the absence of sensor improvement cost influences. In order to account for this cost 
influence, the study conducted a break-even analysis to determine the cost threshold for 
the sensor improvement percentages that represent stand-off ranges outside the RED 
threat envelope for all modeled aircraft. For the purpose of our analysis, CONOPS 2A is 
selected to evaluate the break-even cost of MQ-8C aircraft, CONOPS 2B for MH-60S 
aircraft and CONOPS 3 for RQ-21A aircraft.   
1. MQ-8C 20% Sensor Improvement 
Removal of the MQ-8C from the modeled RED threat requires a 10% sensor 
improvement. A 10% sensor improvement results in a CONOPS 2A mean cost per RED 
kill of 2.6 $M FY16 and a mean total cost of 53.4 $M FY16. These values represent a 
47.0% reduction in mean cost per RED kill and 43.4% reduction in mean total cost 
compared to the baseline values of 4.9 $M and 97.8 $M for CONOPS 2A. We determine 
the break-even cost of the sensor improvement by dividing the total cost savings by the 
quantity of sensor to be improved.   
2A Baseline 2A w/ 10% improvementTotal Cost Savings = Total Cost  Total Cost
Total Cost Savings = 97.8 $M - 53.4 $M
Total Cost Savings = 44.4 $M

 
We assume that all procured MQ-8C receive the 10% sensor improvement. This 
results in a requirement for 32 sensor upgrades. We then divide the total cost savings of 
44.4 $M by the quantity of sensor improvements and determine a break-even 
improvement cost of 1.39 $M FY16 per sensor.    
2. MH-60S 40% Sensor Improvement 
Removal of the MH-60S from the modeled RED threat requires a 40% sensor 
improvement. A 40% sensor improvement resulted in a CONOPS 2B mean cost per RED 
kill of 1.0 $M FY16 and a mean total cost of 19.6 $M FY16. These values represent a 
68.8% reduction in mean cost per RED kill and 69.7% reduction in mean total cost 
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compared to the baseline values of 3.2 $M and 64.7 $M for CONOPS 2B. We use the 
previous methodology and determine the break-even cost of the sensor improvement.  
2B Baseline 2B w/ 40% improvementTotal Cost Savings = Total Cost  Total Cost
Total Cost Savings = 64.7 $M - 19.6 $M
Total Cost Savings = 45.1 $M
Required sensor upgrades = 275




3. RQ-21A 100% Sensor Improvement 
Removal of the RQ-21A from the modeled RED threat requires a 100% sensor 
improvement. A 100% sensor improvement resulted in a CONOPS 3 mean cost per RED 
kill of 0.7 $M FY16 and a mean total cost of 13.4 $M FY16. These values represent a 
65.0% reduction in mean cost per RED kill and 66.7% reduction in mean total cost 
compared to the baseline values of 2.0 $M and 40.2 $M for CONOPS 3  We use the 
previous methodology and determine the break-even cost of the sensor improvement.  
3 Baseline 3 w/ 100% improvementTotal Cost Savings = Total Cost  Total Cost
Total Cost Savings = 40.2 $M - 13.4 $M
Total Cost Savings = 26.8 $M
Required sensor upgrades = 185 




Based on the determined break-even analysis, we estimate that a MQ-8C sensor 
improvement break-even cost of 1.39 $M is greater than the anticipated sensor cost and 
therefore results in an overall cost saving. Conversely, we estimate that the MH-60S 
sensor improvement break-even cost of 0.16 $M and the RQ-21A cost of 0.15 $M are 
less than anticipated sensor costs and therefore should not be implemented. 
While these values and calculations are only valid for the RED threat modeled, its 
weapons envelope and the associated effects on BLUE attrition due to sensor capability 
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changes, it provides a methodology for future inclusion in the cost justification for future 
aircraft sensor upgrades. 
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We simulated four CONOPS and six aircraft configurations to test the 
effectiveness of manned and unmanned aircraft in the execution of FAC / FIAC ASUW 
kill chains. Through the post simulation measurement of four key metrics, cost per RED 
kill, number of RED destroyed, time until 50% attrition of RED forces and average 
BLUE detection time we ranked the performance of the CONOPS. Table 27 presents the 
MOP, MOEs and the CONOPS relative performance rankings (lower numbers represent 
improved performance relative to the other CONOPS). 
Table 27.   CONOPS Overall Ranking 




















6 4 5 5 
MQ-8C 3 
1B MH-60S 6 3 1 3 1 
2A 
MH-60S 3 
5 3 4 2 
MQ-8C 3 
2B MH-60S 6 2 1 3 1 
3 
MH-60S 4 








Based on the simulation results we conclude that the composite manned and 
unmanned aircraft configuration CONOPS 3 outperforms all other evaluated CONOPS 
and aircraft configurations. Composed of four MH-60S and six RQ-21A, CONOPS 3 
achieved study-wide best results in mean cost per RED kill by 13% when compared to 
the next best performance of CONOPS 2B. Additionally, CONOPS 3 ranked second in 
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two of the measures of effectiveness and ranked no lower than third in any performance 
metric. CONOPS 1B and 2B perform well in all key metrics but result in a 38.5% 
increased cost per RED kill compared to CONOPS 3. Composed of only three armed 
aircraft with the third highest average aircraft APUC, CONOPS 1A underperformed in all 
key metrics. While the ranking of the CONOPS provides an indication of preferred 
aircraft configuration, simulation results determined that no singular factor is the sole 
determinant of performance.   We present the most significant factors supported by the 
post simulation analysis. 
1. BLUE Survivability 
Simulation results indicate that BLUE survivability effects FAC / FIAC ASUW 
kill chain effectiveness when all BLUE aircraft are at risk to RED weapons. CONOPS 2B 
and 1B consistently outperformed all other evaluated CONOPS in terms of BLUE 
attrition due to RED weapons engagements. The increased survivability of the MH-60S 
aircraft compared to the RQ-21A and MQ-8C resulted in 17.8% reduction in mean BLUE 
kills compared to CONOPS with manned and unmanned aircraft and a 45.6% reduction 
compared to CONOPS with only unmanned aircraft. This reduction in BLUE aircraft 
attrition limits attrition costs and preserves the capability to destroy RED forces.    
2. Aircraft APUC 
The employment of low cost aircraft improves cost per RED kill performance. 
Despite the study-wide second highest number of mean BLUE kills, configured with six 
RQ-21A CONOPS 3 achieves a mean cost per RED kill 17% lower than any other 
evaluated CONOPS or aircraft configuration. With a mean APUC 84.4% less than the 
other modeled aircraft, RQ-21A losses result in a mean attrition cost 35.8% less than the 
average attrition cost across all other studied CONOPS.   
3. Sortie Duration 
 Increased BLUE aircraft sortie duration decreases the time required to attrite 
enemy forces. Despite the superior performance of manned aircraft configured CONOPS 
in most performance categories, the limited sortie duration and resulting increased 
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requirement for recoveries and post-flight maintenance negatively impacts the ability for 
CONOPS 1B and 2B to achieve 50% RED attrition. With an average aircraft sortie length 
of 3.5 hours, CONOPS 1B and 2B require an average of 37 recoveries per aircraft 
compared to 23.5 recoveries per aircraft for the composite CONOPS and 23.7 for the 
unmanned CONOPS during the simulation of a 30-day ASUW operation. This increased 
demand for recoveries reduces mean executed flight hours by 26% and 65% compared to 
composite and unmanned only CONOPS, respectively. The decreased flight hours, 
increases the time to detect, classify and destroy and resulted in approximately a 15% 
increase in time until 50% RED attrition.   
4. Unmanned and Unarmed Aircraft Limitations 
The performance of CONOPS 1A demonstrates that small quantities of unarmed 
unmanned aerial vehicles are ineffective at supporting the execution of ASUW kill 
chains. Without the ability to prosecute RED threats, unarmed MQ-8C aircraft result in a 
283% increase in mean time until 50% RED attrition and a 4% increase in mean cost per 
RED kill compared to the armed MQ-8C in CONOPS 2A.   
Performance limitations created by unarmed aircraft decrease as the quantity of 
unarmed aircraft increases.  Simulation of CONOPS 3 and 4, with 6 and 9 unarmed 
aircraft respectively, maintain the ability to effectively prosecute RED threats and 
resulted in study-wide best mean time until 50% RED attrition. The additional unarmed 
aircraft result in greater resilience to BLUE attrition, generate increased flight hours and 
maintain an effective lethality to destroy RED threats. 
5. Sensor Performance Influence on Total Cost  
 Sensor capabilities influence FAC/FIAC ASUW kill chain execution 
effectiveness. Sensitivity analysis determined that with knowledge of the RED weapons 
capabilities (maximum range and altitude), increases in BLUE sensor capabilities can 
eliminate BLUE losses due to RED weapon engagements. With the elimination of BLUE 
kills, operating costs contribute the greatest percentage of total cost and become the most 
significant factor in cost per RED kill performance.   
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6. Ordnance Costs and Accuracy 
Ordnance costs affect kill chain execution efficiency. Simulation results of 
CONOPS 1B and 2B indicate that moderate decreases in ordnance per round cost 
influence cost per RED kill. Equipped with HELLFIRE missiles, CONOPS 1B results in 
a mean cost per RED kill of 3.3 $M FY16. Simulation of CONOPS 2B equipped with 
APKWS-II rockets results in a mean cost per RED kill of 3.2 $M FY16. With a 65% less 
expensive cost per round, the APKWS-II equipped CONOPS 2B produced an ordnance 
mean cost savings of 1.3 $M FY16 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this study provides valuable insight into the effectiveness of manned and 
unmanned aircraft in the execution of FAC / FIAC ASUW kill chains it is limited by its 
underlying assumptions and the accuracy of its aircraft sensor performance calculations. 
We recommend future research and expansion on this study in the following areas in 
order to develop a complete programmatic and operational planning tool. 
 Expand upon the day-light only model implemented within this study 
through the inclusion of night ASUW operations supported by IR sensors. 
 Improve accuracy of results through the validation of notional values 
utilized in the model as operational use of the evaluated aircraft models 
increases and additional reliability data becomes available. 
 Apply cost estimate relationships to improve the accuracy of sensor 
improvement break-even analysis. 
 Compare study results obtained via SIMIO against other available agent-
based simulation software. 
 Incorporate geographic specific area of operations and predicted tactical 
and operational schemes of maneuver to increase the fidelity of the results 
determined by this study. 
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APPENDIX A. BLUE AIRCRAFT SENSOR CAPABILITIES 
A. EO SENSOR PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
The study utilizes imagery requirements and sensor parameters to determine 
sensor sweepwidth and maximum sensor to target altitude (ALT) and slant range (SR).   
Table 28 presents the baseline sensor parameters at the conclusion of the appendix. 
1. Imagery Requirements 
National Image Interpretability Rating Scales (NIIRS) values determine imagery 
requirements based on physical characteristics of the modeled RED target and the 
estimated resolution requirements for target detection and classification. The study 
selected a NIIRS value of 4 for detection and 6 for classification. Figures 31 and 32 
present the NIIRS scale definitions for the values utilized in the model. 
 
 




Figure 32.  NIIRS 6—Classification. Source: Pike (par. 5) 
We convert NIIRS values to ground separable distance (GSD) for use in sensor 
sweepwidth calculations by a derived equation from the logarithmic regression of 






2. Sensor Sweepwidth Calculations 
Table 28 provides the initial values for the sensor parameters obtained from 
UNCLASSIFIED sources listed in Chapter II.B sections 1–3. Notional values are 
italicized. The study utilized these values and the derived GSD to determine sensor 
sweepwidth (SW) for the modeled aircraft.   
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Table 28.   Modeled Aircraft EO Sensor Parameters 




 Effective Focal 
Length 
(EFL) 























Sample calculation for MH-60S with a NIIRS level of 6
GSD 0.45m
SW  = GSD Horizontal Pixels            (Olsen n. pag.)














3. Maximum Slant Range (Sensor to Target) Calculations 
We determined maximum sensor to target slant range (SR) through varying the 
sensor to target angle (θ), maintaining GSD requirements, sensor pixel pitch (PP) and 




GSD  cos (90- )*EFL
SR =           (Leachtenauer 18)
PP
sample calculation of SR for the MH-60S with GSD of 0.45 m
GSD  cos (90- )*EFL 0.45 m  cos(90- )  .07m
SR = 
PP .00009m










ts and maximization of aircraft altitude 
we determined an optimal sensor to target angle of 52.5  










4. Maximum Altitude (Sensor to Target) Calculations 
60 60
60
ALT  = SR *cos( )
sample calculation for MH-60S
ALT  = SR *cos( )
ALT  = 2776.7m *cos(52.5) = 1690.3m
y y







5. Calculated Values for Modeled Aircraft 
























MH-60S 1203.2 4 1.88 77.5 14276 3090* 6 0.45 52.5 2777 1690 
MQ-8C 940.0 4 1.88 73.3 17977 5180* 6 0.45 51.8 3557 2200 
RQ-21A 1203.2 4 1.88 59.4 8977 4570* 6 0.45 53.7 2026 1200 
* indicates altitude limited by aircraft maximum operational ceiling 
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APPENDIX B. MODEL COST CALCULATIONS 
B. MODELED AIRCRAFT APUC CALCULATIONS 
The Joint Inflation Calculator Navy Aircraft procurement index (APN 1506) 
provides required inflation current year (CY) to current year (CY) indices for adjustment 
from the aircraft program base year (BY) to FY 2016 dollars utilized in the study 
(ncca.navy.mil/tools/inflation.cfm). Table 30 provides the FY16 APUC values for the 
modeled aircraft. Chapter II.B.1-3 provides source information for BY APUC values. 







$M $CY to $CY $M FY16 
MH-60S 21.08 1998 1.35 28.46 
MQ-8C 23.29 2006 1.18 27.48 
RQ-21A 3.97 2010 1.09 4.33 
 
C. MODELED AIRCRAFT O&S PER FLIGHT HOUR CALCULATIONS 
The study derived O&S cost per flight hour from the annual O&S cost divided by 
the projected annual flight hours for each year (yr).   
1. Annual O&S Calculation 
Table 31 presents the modeled aircraft annual O&S expenditures. Chapter II.B.1-
3 provides source information for O&S total service life values. 
  
 104 
Table 31.   Modeled Aircraft Annual O&S Costs 
Aircraft 
O&S 




$M Years $M 
MH-60S 77.60 20 3.88 
MQ-8C 1518.1 20 75.91 
RQ-21A 1420.54 20 71.03 
 
2. Average O&S Cost per Flight Hour 
Table 32 provides sample calculations for the RQ-21A based on total 
programmatic O&S costs distributed equally over a projected 20-year service life. 
Chapter II.B.1-3 provides sources information for RQ-21 O&S values and service life 
estimates. 










BY 10 $M 
 
RQ-21 O&S/hr 
2014 1868 71.0272 0.038023126 
   2015 3269 71.0272 0.021727501 
 
Mean 0.009554 
2016 4670 71.0272 0.015209251 
 
Standard Error 0.002552 
2017 6538 71.0272 0.01086375 
 
Median 0.003724 
2018 10058 71.0272 0.007061762 
 
Mode 0.003724 
2019 13937 71.0272 0.005096305 
 
Standard Deviation 0.011124 
2020 16272 71.0272 0.004364995 
 
Sample Variance 0.000124 
2021 18140 71.0272 0.003915502 
 
Kurtosis 3.270648 
2022 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Skewness 2.062537 
2023 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Range 0.034298 
2024 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Minimum 0.003724 
2025 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Maximum 0.038022 
2026 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Sum 0.181517 
2027 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
 
Count 19 




2029 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
   2030 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
   2031 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
   2032 19074 71.0272 0.003723771 
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The Joint Inflation Calculator Navy Operations and Maintenance (Composite) 
procurement index (O&MN 1804) provides required inflation indices for adjustment of 
the mean annual O&S cost per hour from the aircraft program base year (BY) to FY 2016 
dollars utilized in the study (ncca.navy.mil/tools/inflation.cfm). Table 33 presents the 
FY16 mean O&S per flight hour values for the modeled aircraft.  









$M $CY to $CY $M FY16 
MH-60S 0.0106 1998 1.572 0.0166 
MQ-8C 0.0154 2006 1.200 0.0185 
RQ-21A 0.0095 2010 1.070 0.0102 
 
D. ORDNANCE COST CALCULATIONS 
The Joint Inflation Calculator Navy weapons procurement index (WPN 1507) 
provides required inflation indices for adjustment from the HELLFIRE missile base year 
(BY) to FY 2016 dollars utilized in the study. The Joint Inflation Calculator Navy 
procurement of ammunitions index (PANMC 1508) provides required inflation indices for 
adjustment from the APKWS-II rocket base year (BY) to FY 2016 dollars utilized in the 
study (ncca.navy.mil/tools/inflation.cfm). Chapter II.B.1-3 provides source information for 
ordnance cost per round. Table 34 presents the FY16 ordnance per round costs.  









$M $CY to $CY $M FY16 
AGM-114 
HELLFIRE 
0.086 2017 0.98 0.085 
APKWS-II 0.031 2016 1.00 0.031 
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APPENDIX C. MODEL PROPERTIES AND STATE VARIABLES 
Table 35.   SIMIO Model Sets and Indices 
Sets and Indices 
Label Definition 
 1,2,3,..,v V m   Individual RED threats 
 1,2,3,..,x X n    Individual aircraft 
 1,2,3y Y    Aircraft type/model/series 
















Table 36.   SIMIO Aircraft States 
Aircraft States 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
TakeoffTimex   Aircraft Takeoff Time Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
,Payloadx z  
Aircraft Ordnance 
Payload 
Scalar Integer NA 
Sweepwidth_Locatey  
Aircraft sweepwidth in 
SURVEILLANCE 
Scalar Real nm 
Sweepwidth_IDy  
Aircraft sweepwidth in 
CLASSIFICATION 
Scalar Real nm 
,Weapon_TOFx z  Ordnance time of flight Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
UNSKEDx  
Indication of aircraft in 
flight failure triggering 
unscheduled 
maintenance 
Binary Integer  0,1   
SKEDx  
Indication of aircraft in 
flight failure triggering 
a scheduled 
maintenance interval 
Binary Integer  0,1   
Num_Hellfirex  
Aircraft payload of 
Hellfire ordnance 
Scalar Integer NA 
Num_APKWSx  
Aircraft payload of 
APKWS ordnance 
Scalar Integer NA 
,zPayload_CEPx  
Aircraft ordnance type 
dependent CEP 
Scalar Real m 
CID_Quick_Duration y  
Aircraft classification 
time in RE-ATTACK 
events 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Blue_Quick_CIDy  




Binary Integer  0,1  
Reacquire_Duration y  
Aircraft reacquire time 
following missed 
weapons engagements 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Weapon_Altitudey  
Aircraft altitude in 
WEAPON event 
Scalar Real m 
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Aircraft States (cont.) 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
Weapon_Slant_Rangey  
Aircraft slant range in 
WEAPON event 
Scalar Real m 
SURV_Altitudey  
Aircraft altitude in 
SURVEILLANCE 
event 
Scalar Real m 
SURV_Slant_Rangey  
Aircraft slant range in 
SURVEILLANCE 
Scalar Real m 
CID_Altitudey  
Aircraft altitude in 
CLASSIFICATION 
event 
Scalar Real m 
CID_Slant_Rangey  
Aircraft slant range in 
CLASSIFICATION 
Scalar Real m 
MISHAPx  
Indication of aircraft 
mishap 
Binary Integer  0,1   
Mishap_Clockx  
Cumulative aircraft 
flight hours used to 
activate a mishap 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Mishap_Timex  
Aircraft flight time 
until mishap event 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Failure_Clockx  
Cumulative aircraft 
flight hours used to 
activate an in-flight 
failure 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Failure_Timex  
Aircraft flight time 
until in-flight failure 
event 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
SKED_Clockx  
Cumulative aircraft 
flight hours used to 
activate a schedule 
maintenance action 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
,SKED_Timex y  
Aircraft flight time 
until scheduled 
maintenance action 





Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Sortie_Lengthx  
Aircraft sortie length 
on current flight event  




Aircraft States (cont.) 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
Blue_Kill_Assignment x  




Scalar Integer  0,1,2,3,4  




Scalar Real m 
,Pk x z  
Aircraft probability of 
kill 
Scalar Real 0-1 
Landing_Classx  
Triggers aircraft 
required post flight 
maintenance action 




Table 37.   SIMIO Aircraft Properties 
Aircraft Properties 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
Search_Velocityx  
Aircraft velocity in 
SURVEILLANCE 
event 
Scalar Real knots 
Max_Velocityx  Aircraft max velocity Scalar Real knots 
Sortie_Durationx  
Aircraft maximum 
time of flight per sortie 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Hellfire_Altitudex  
Aircraft altitude for 
HELLFIRE 
engagement 
Scalar Real m 
Hellfire_Velocity  
Hellfire velocity in 
flight 
Scalar Real m/s 
Hellfire_Payloadx  
Aircraft initial Hellfire 
payload 
Scalar Integer  0 6  
APKWS_Altitudex  
Aircraft altitude for 
APKWS engagement 
Scalar Real m 
APKWS_Velocity  
APKWS velocity in 
flight 









Aircraft Properties (cont.) 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
SkedMaintIntervalx  
Aircraft flight hours 
between scheduled 
maintenance 





Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
FailureRatex  
Aircraft flight hours 
between in-flight 
failures 





Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Post_Flight_Durationx  
Duration of routine 
post flight 
maintenance actions 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
MishapRatex  
Aircraft flight hours 
between mishaps 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Spotting_Timex  
Duration of aircraft 
flight deck spotting 
evolutions  
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Takeoff_Timex  
Duration of aircraft 
takeoff evolutions  
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
CID_Timex  
Duration of transfer 
of data and GCS 
target evaluation  
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Assess_Timex  
Duration of GCS 
confirmation of RED 
kill 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
Recovery_Timex  
Duration of aircraft 
recovery 





Scalar Real nm 
Red_CID_Pdx  
RED probability of 
BLUE in CID event 




Table 38.   SIMIO Model States 
Model States 
Label Definition Type Dimension 
NumDet  Number of detections Scalar Integer 
NumKill  Number of RED killed Scalar Integer 
NumFlights  Number of flights Scalar Integer 
NumSys  












Number of BLUE in-
flight failures 
Scalar Integer 
NumRedShots  Number of RED shots Scalar Integer 
NumRedMiss  
Number of RED 
missed shots 
Scalar Integer 
Gamma  Search effort Scalar Real 
Red_Number_Scans  
Number of RED 
search scans in 
CLASSIFICATION 
and WEAPON events 
Scalar Real 
Red_Total_Glimpses  















Model States (cont.) 
Label Definition Type Dimension 
RedShots_Weapon  



































Time of RED 
annihilation 
Scalar Time 
RQ21TFT  RQ21 total flight time Scalar Time 
MQ8TFT  














Table 39.   SIMIO Model Properties 
Model Properties  
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
SearchArea  
Size of operational 
areas 
Scalar Real sq nm 
MQ8C  Number of MQ-8C Scalar Integer  
RQ21A  Number of RQ-21A Scalar Integer  
MH60S  Number of MH-60S Scalar Integer  
Ship_Spots  
Number of flight deck 
spots available for 
takeoff and landings 
Scalar Integer  
CCS_Control_Limit  
Maximum number of 
aircraft in-flight limit 
Scalar Integer  
Num_RED  
Number of RED 
surface threats 





Scalar Integer  
Red_Velocity  
Velocity of RED 
threats 
Scalar Real knots 
Red_size  Size of RED threats  Scalar Real sq m 
Red_Weapon_Time  
Time for RED to 
engage weapons 
Scalar Time HH:MM:SS 
RED_CEP  CEP of RED weapons Scalar Real m 
Hellfire_CEP  
CEP of Hellfire 
weapons 
Scalar Real m 
APKWS_CEP  
CEP of APKWS 
weapons 
Scalar Real m 
RED_Range_Max  
Maximum range of 
RED weapons 




Model Properties (cont.) 
Label Definition Type Dimension Units 
RED_Alt_Max  
Maximum 
engagement altitude of 
RED weapons 
Scalar Real m 
RED_Sweep_Width  
Visual sweepwidth of 
RED threats 
Scalar Real m 
RED_Scanners  
Number of Red 
searchers per vessel 
Scalar Integer  
Red_Scan_Vertical  
Vertical dimension of 
RED visual scan 
Scalar Real 0-90 
Red_Glimpse_Duration  
Time per glimpse of 
RED searchers 




APPENDIX D. PROBABILITY OF KILL CALCULATIONS 
Target projected size and ordnance CEP determine single shot probability of kill. 
The study calculates unadjusted BLUE (x) and RED (v) single shot probability of kill 
(Pk) with the equation 
 
Projected Size






       (Bektas par. 4) 
 
Based on a RED projected size of 22.16 m, a sample calculation for the 


















We apply corrections to unadjusted single shot probability of kills for the 
following targets (Adams): 
 
 RQ-21 and MQ-8C - RED acquisition difficulty due to low heat signature 
 MH-60S - Defensive maneuvering and countermeasures   
 RED – BLUE laser designation degradation due to maritime environments 
 
Table 40 presents the unadjusted single shot probability of kills, correction 
factors, and final single shot probability of kills for all BLUE ordnance versus modeled 
RED forces. Table 41 presents the single shot probability of kill for RED forces verses all 
modeled BLUE forces. 
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HELLFIRE 0.9997 0.8 0.7997 
APKWS-II 0.9999 0.8 0.7999 








MH-60S 0.9999 0.8 0.7999 
MQ-8C 0.9999 0.9 0.8999 
RQ-21A 0.9960 0.85 0.8466 
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APPENDIX E. BLUE AND RED SURVEILLANCE EVENT 
CALCULATIONS 
Table 42.   Model Sets and Indices 
Sets and Indices 
Label Definition 
 1,2,3,..,v V m   Individual RED threats 
 1,2,3,..,x X n    Individual aircraft 
 1,2,3y Y    Aircraft type/model/series 
 1,2z Z    Ordnance type 
 
E. BLUE SURVEILLANCE CALCULATIONS 
Upon BLUE aircraft commencement of SURVEILLANCE event 
 
 Calculation of BLUE search rate based on the summation all BLUE 




Gamma  = 
SearchArea







 Calculation of BLUE detection time, adjusted for number of RED 
destroyed and NEUTRAL shipping presence 
1






 Calculation of number of BLUE aircraft conducting SURVEILLANCE 
BLUE_SURV_Count = BLUE_SURV_Count 1  
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Upon BLUE completion and exit of SURVEILLANCE event 
 Adjustment of BLUE search rate for exiting BLUE aircraft 
Velocity *Search_ Sweepwidth
Gamma  = Gamma
SearchArea
x x
BLUE BLUE   
 Adjustment of BLUE aircraft conducting SURVEILLANCE for exiting 
BLUE aircraft 
BLUE_SURV_Count = BLUE_SURV_Count - 1  
F. RED SURVEILLANCE CALCULATIONS 
 Calculation of RED search sweepwidth based on 5 degree foveal vision of 
RED during visual search for BLUE (Jones 25). Sample calculation 
provided for RED sweepwidth for MH-60S. 
 










Slant Range  = 
cos(sensor to target angle  + 2.5)
Surveillance Altitude
Slant Range  = 
cos(sensor to target angle  + 2.5)
3090 m












Search_Sweepwidth  = Slant Range   tan(5)
 Search_Sweepwidth  = 17794.6  tan(5)





















 Calculation of RED detection time adjusted for number of RED remaining 
1
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APPENDIX F. RED DETECTION OF BLUE IN CLASSIFICATION 
EVENTS CALCULATIONS 
The study calculates RED time to detect BLUE during CLASSIFICATION events 
with discrete glimpse probabilities determined via the U.S. Army Night Vision Integrated 
Performance Model software (U.S. Army, NV-IPM V1.2). BLUE slant range, altitude, 
target contrast and projected size affect the RED glimpse probability.   
G. BLUE PROJECTED SIZE 







    (Poe 16) 




Projected Size 4.4m 15.3m
Projected Size 15.9m






H. RED GLIMPSE PROBABILITIES  
Table 43 presents the baseline RED glimpse probabilities of detection (Pd) for the 
modeled BLUE aircraft. Appendix A provides calculations for aircraft classification slant 
range (SR) and altitude (ALT). The study uses the U.S. Army Night Vision Integrated 
Performance Model software (U.S. Army, NV-IPM V1.2) to determine the RED glimpse 
probabilities of detection. 










MH-60S 15.4 2777 1690 .498 
MQ-8C 10.9 3557 2200 .491 
RQ-21A 5.5 2026 1200 .488 
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I. RED DETECTION TIME CALCULATION DURING BLUE 
CLASSIFICATION EVENT 
RED detection time is a function of  
 RED glimpse probability ( vPd ) – described in Section B 
 Number of RED scanners ( vScanners ) – model assumption is 2 scanners 
per RED ship 
 RED glimpse duration ( vGD ) – 0.333 seconds (Jones 23) 
 RED horizontal scan dimension ( vHS ) – 360 degrees (notional horizontal 
scan) 
 RED vertical scan dimension ( vVS ) – 35 degrees  (notional vertical scan) 
 RED field of view ( vFOV ) – 5 degrees (Jones 24) 
The study calculates RED detection time with the equations. 
1. Number of glimpses per complete scan 







2. Scans until detection 
Scans until detection = random geometric (Pd )v  
3. Glimpses required on successful scan 
Glimpses on successful scan = random uniform (1, Glimpses per full scan)  
4. RED total glimpses 
Total glimpses  = (Scans until successful  Glimpses per scan + Glimpses on successful scan)v 
 
5. RED detection time 
RED detection time = Total glimpses  * GDv v   
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APPENDIX G. MODELED AIRCRAFT AND RED BASELINE 
PARAMETERS 
Table 44 presents the aircraft maintenance and kill chain event duration 
parameters utilized in the SIMIO model. Notional or estimated parameters are italicized. 
Chapter II.B.1-3 provides source information for BLUE aircraft parameters. Chapter 
II.C.3.d provides source information for RED parameters. 
Table 44.   Modeled Aircraft Parameters 
Aircraft Properties 
Label MH-60S MQ-8C RQ-21A Units 
Search_Velocity  75.0 60.0 55.0 knots 
Sortie_Duration  3.5 12.0 10.0 hours 
Hellfire_Velocity  450.0 450.0 N/A m/s 
Hellfire_Payload  8 0 0  0 8  
APKWS_Velocity  420.0 420.0 N/A m/s 
APKWS_Payload  19 7 N/A  0 19  
SkedMaintInterval  30.0 25.0 100.0 hours 
Sked_Maint_Duration  10.7 1.57 3.5 hours 
FailureRate  20.3 30.0 45.0 hours 
Unsked_Maint_Duration  3.6 2.5 0.5 hours 
Post_Flight_Duration  1.5 0.75 0.5 hours 
MishapRate  88495 1876 1000 
flight hours 
until mishap 
Spotting_Time  30 30 10.0 min 











Aircraft Properties (cont.) 
Label MH-60S MQ-8C RQ-21A Units 
CID_Time  0.5 1.0 1.0 min 
Assess_Time  0.5 1.0 N/A min 
Trigger_Time  0.167 0.1 N/A min 
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